






Brooklyn Law School, bennett.capers@brooklaw.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Other Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation




During my fifth year as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the South-
ern District of New York, I transferred from the Violent Gangs Unit
to the Securities and Commodities Fraud Unit. Even within the U.S.
Attorney's Office, which already had the rarefied air of an exclusive
country club,1 the Securities and Commodities Fraud Unit had a repu-
tation for being an even more exclusive "boy's club." I mention this
to provide some context, but also to explain-or is it to excuse-my
inaction. Acquiescence. Silence.
The other part of the context is this: Nearly a third of my of my
unit, including the chief of the unit at the time, were attending a three-
day Securities Fraud course at the National Advocacy Center
(NAC)-the training center for federal prosecutors2-in South Caro-
* Copyright 1. Bennett Capers, 2003. Assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern District of New
York 1995-2004, and Adjunct Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. J.D. Columbia Law
School, 1991. I am indebted to many people for their suggestions and encouragement, including
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Peggy C. Davis, Seth Michael Forman, Astrid Gloade, Michael
Dorf, The Honorable Deborah A. Batts, Jasper Johns, Randolph Ross, and Vanessa Merton.
Finally, I must extend a special thanks to Derrick Bell and Patricia Williams, whose pioneering
work served as an inspiration throughout this project.
1. As I write this, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York is
comprised of approximately 241 attorneys, of which only 4 are African American. This is a drop
from the usual number of African American prosecutors, which is 7. Indeed, known by African
American prosecutors and defense lawyers around the country for never having more than 7
frican American prosecutors at a time, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of
New York has much in common with the fictitious law school in DERRICK BELL, Chronicle of the
DeVine Gift, in AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 140-61
(1987). This homogeneity is by no means limited to the Southern District of New York, but
rather extends throughout the Department of Justice, as evidenced by a recent, but unsuccessful,
diversity initiative. See Tom Brune, Justice Diversity Drive Opens Door to White Men, NEWS-
DAY, Oct. 17, 2003, at A20. The findings of an internal report of diversity within the Department
of Justice were so dismal that the Department declined to post the full report on its website, and
instead posted a version with half of its 186 pages, including the summary, blacked out. David
Johnston & Eric Lichtblau, A Critical Study, Minus Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2003, at A19.
2. NAC is operated by the Department of Justice, and provides training programs for fed-
eral government personnel through the Office of Legal Education of the Executive Office for
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lina, which just so happens to be my home state. This was in 2000, the
year that the NAACP and other organizations were calling for a boy-
cott of South Carolina because of its prominent display of the Confed-
erate flag atop of its capitol building.'
That the Justice Department continued to send its attorneys to
South Carolina was, to my mind, an issue in itself. Although there
had been a few isolated and whispered grumblings among minority
employees about the Justice Department's practice, lacking a critical
mass, our grumblings remained whispers, or were met with the re-
sponse that the South Carolina Legislature had already offered a com-
promise by lowering the flag from its position on top of the capitol
building.4
Indeed, I employ the term "critical mass" in the hope of contex-
tualizing its meaning, which apparently still remains a subject of de-
bate. During oral argument in the affirmative action case Grutter v.
Bollinger,5 for example, Justice Antonin Scalia demanded a numerical
definition.
Justice Scalia: Is [two] percent a critical mass, Ms. Mahoney?
Ms. Mahoney (University of Michigan): I don't think so, Your
Honor.
Justice Scalia: OK. Four percent?
Ms. Mahoney: No, Your Honor. What you...
Justice Scalia: You have to pick some number, don't you?
Ms. Mahoney: Well, actually what the ...
Justice Scalia: Like [eight]? Is [eight] percent?
Ms. Mahoney: Your Honor, the... 6
In fact, critical mass is not solely numerical. Rather, a critical
mass implies a climate where one is neither conspicuous nor on dis-
play, where one does not feel the opprobrium of being a token, nor
the burden of being the designated representative for an entire group.
U.S. Attorneys. For an example of training for state and local prosecutors that the NAC pro-
vides, see http://www.usadoj.gov/usao/eousa/ole (describing the NAC).
3. See, e.g., Rick Freeman, South Carolina's Allegiance to the Flag; State Is a Sports Outcast
Because of Confederate Link, WASH. POST, May 20, 2000, at D1; NAACP Votes to Boycott South
Carolina over Flag, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 1999, at A43; Sue Anne Pressley, Boycott Aims to
Bring Flag Down; NAACP Targets South Carolina Tourism to Rid Capitol of 'Symbol of Slavery,'
WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1999, at A3.
4. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-10-10 (2000) (authorizing removal of Confederate flag from
atop the dome of the State House, and the installation of a Confederate flag on the grounds of
the Capitol Complex, effective July 1, 2000).
5. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
6. Morning Edition: Profile: Supreme Court Hears Affirmative Action Cases (NPR radio
broadcast, Apr. 2, 2003), available at 2003 WL 4857011.
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It also implies a climate where one can speak freely, where one not
only has a voice, but a voice that will be heard. In the Justice Depart-
ment, a critical mass was what we lacked.
Our concerns remained whispers; trivialized; disregarded. It
seemed of no import that, having removed the Confederate flag from
atop of the capitol, the legislature immediately reinstalled it in front of
the capitol where, if anything, the flag was even more visible.7 No
import at all. In fact, during my time at the NAC, where I and a few
other African Americans were like flies in buttermilk really, there was
no mention of the flag, at least not in my presence, and had things
proceeded in this uneventful manner, I probably would not be writing
this Article. On either our second or last night in Columbia, however,
it occurred to those of us from my office that we had not tried any of
the barbeque that seemed the local staple, and we asked one of the
administrators at the NAC if she would recommend a good barbeque
joint.
I remember that the administrator reminded me of the actress
Betty White in the television show Golden Girls,8 or better yet her
role in the movie Bringing Down the House.9 I also remember that as
she looked at the group of us, she seemed hesitant. "Well," she began,
"the absolute best barbeque place is Maurice's BBQ." "That's where
we want to go," the chief of my unit said. "The thing is"-was it here
that I sensed she was avoiding eye contact with me?-"the owner has
a lot of Confederate flags up. Some of you might be put off by that.
There are other places though."
The chief looked at me and at another member of our group, an
Asian American. I have no doubt he was sincere in not wanting the
two of us to feel uncomfortable. "It's really up to you," he said. The
others in our group waited patiently, though a few looked away. "Do
you want us to go someplace else?" the chief asked. I have no doubt
that he thought he was being solicitous. "If it bothers the two of you,
it's no problem."
7. Pamela Hamilton, Confederate Flag Remains Hot Issue, Despite Relocation; NAACP,
Not Happy with Compromise, Is Still Pushing for Boycott, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, July 20, 2003,
at 10Y.
8. Golden Girls (NBC television broadcast 1985-1992); see also Ultimate Golden Girls
Cite, at http://www.geocities.com/SouthBeachIStrand/5836/goldengirls.htm (last visited Sept. 19,
2004).
9. BRINGINc DOWN THE HOUSE (Touchstone Pictures 1993); see also Earth's Biggest




Of course I would rather have gone someplace else, but again,
lacking a critical mass, I felt powerless even to voice an objection. To
borrow from W.E.B. DuBois, in the intersection of large ideas and
every day experience, I, as an African American, was a "problem."1
So we went. I convinced myself that, if nothing more, it would at
least be an adventure. Something I could later joke about with my
better half back in New York. Inside the restaurant, the Confederate
flag was everywhere. The owner had even set up a gift shop of sorts,
where one could purchase replicas of the Confederate flag, battle flag
socks, Tenth Amendment Heritage Protector t-shirts, Confederate
flag beach towels, and, most American of all, Confederate flag base-
ball caps. For a donation-to what, I did not want to know-custom-
ers could also receive pamphlets reminiscent of W.D. Griffith's "true"
story of the South in Birth of a Nation," pamphlets such as Honest
Abe Wasn't Honest, and The Truth About the Confederate Flag.12
Until that point, I had followed the news articles about the public
controversy surrounding state displays of the Confederate flag with
some remove. While I was personally offended by the choice, in the
scheme of things, or so I thought, there were far more pressing issues
to address. 3 It was just a flag, after all, a rectangle of cloth on a pole,
a minor matter. Sitting in this restaurant, however, I began to realize
that this wasn't just about a flag. Rather, the flag was, in a way, inex-
tricably tied to numerous other issues involving race and privilege.
This was about South Carolina's state-supported military college
the Citadel, founded to quell a slave uprising,14 which ten years ago
10. W.E.B. Du Bois, THE SouLs OF BLACK FOLK 1-2 (First Vintage Books 1990) (1986).
11. BIRTH OF A NATION (Epoch Pictures 1915). W.D. Griffith's film purports to portray the
deleterious effects of emancipation on a South Carolina family of slave owners. The film opens
with images of field slaves contentedly picking cotton, and house slaves blithely waiting on their
beneficent masters.
12. Additional curios and books, such as MYTHS & RFALITIES OF AMERICAN SLAVERY,
THE CONFEDERATE COOKBOOK, and ARGUING THE CASE FOR SOUTHERN SECESSION, can be
purchased online through Maurice Bessinger's "Truth Store;" see http://www.mauricesbbq.com
for more details.
13. State Representative Joe Neal, former chairman of the Legislative Black Caucus in
South Carolina, recently echoed this sentiment. See Hamilton, supra note 7 (quoting Represen-
tative Neal as stating, "[wie don't have the luxury of just dealing with the flag. There are so
many other issues that have been pressing").
14. In June 1822, 2,500 armed Whites patrolled the streets of Charleston in response to
information that enslaved Blacks were planning a revolt to obtain their freedom. Ultimately,
over 131 [B]lacks were arrested, and 35, including the leader of the revolt Denmark Vesey, were
sentenced to death. The city freed the slave who revealed the planned uprising to his master,
and transferred the discipline of other "problem" slaves to the public sphere:
At the workhouse, a treadmill was installed. Now plantation owners-for a fee-could
bring recalcitrant slaves to be lashed to an overhead pole and forced to run along a
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fought the admission of women,15 and where until recently Dixie was
turning wheel while "drivers" whipped and pushed them on. So long as a man or wo-
man kept the pace, the pain was not so bad. But once a person's legs gave out, those
wooden steps slapped hard into bare flesh while strips of cowhide tore and snapped.
CATHERINE S. MANEGOLD, IN GLORY'S SHADOW: SHANNON FAULKNER, THE CITADEL, AND A
CHANGING AMERICA 35 (1999).
Finally, to protect Whites from any future uprising, the city created a corp of cadets,
reinvented as a school in 1842. In return for keeping free [Bilacks and slaves "completely
subordinate," as local ordinances required, cadets, initially comprised of impoverished Whites,
received a free education. Id. at 37-38.
15. Throughout most of its 160-year history, the Citadel, which until recently boasted a
Confederate flag on the water tower high over its campus, was exclusively White, and exclusively
male. Even after the first Black male student was admitted, the sole Black cadet in the class of
1970, the school continued to maintain a policy excluding women from its Corps of Cadets, and
racism persisted. See generally Ellan Yan, Battles Won Before Shannon, NEWSDAY, Sept. 2, 1996,
at A19; Profile: Black Female Cadets Graduating From the Citadel (NPR radio broadcast. May
10, 2002), available at 2002 WL 3188070. For example, a 1977 college yearbook shows cadets
outfitted in white robes and hoods pointing a gun at a Black cadet with a noose around his neck.
See MANEGOLD, supra note 14, at 136. Nearly a decade later, on October 23, 1986, several White
cadets, again dressed in the garb of the Ku Klux Klan, burst into a Black freshman's room bran-
dishing a burnt cross and shouting obscenities. The Black cadet quit the Citadel shortly after the
incident, and brought a lawsuit. The White cadets-Steven Webb, Jeffery Plumley, Paul Koss,
Jimmy Biggerstaff and Maurice Bostic, Jr-eventually settled out of court for approximately
$880.000. but not before graduating from the Citadel. See Paul Leavitt, Nationline, USA TODAY,
Jan. 24, 1989, at A3. The Justice Department declined to seek criminal charges against the per-
petrators. Bruce Smith, Official Says No Federal Criminal Prosecution in Citadel Hazing, Asso-
CIATED PRESS, Oct. 13, 1987, available at 1987 WL 3183141.
In 1993. a female high school student, Shannon Faulkner, launched an attack on the Cita-
del's male-only policy by gaining admission for matriculation, and only then declaring her gen-
der. Upon learning Faulkner was female, the Citadel promptly revoked her admission, and
Faulkner promptly brought a § 1983 action alleging an Equal Protection violation. Faulkner v.
Jones, 858 F. Supp. 552 (D.S.C. 1994). Although the district court found, after a two-week bench
trial, that the Citadel's male-only admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause and
ordered the Citadel to admit Faulkner to the Corps of Cadets beginning in the fall of 1994, the
4th Circuit modified the remedial order. Following its holding in United States v. Virginia, (VMI
1) 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 946 (1993), in which it held that Virginia's
violation of the Equal Protection Clause through its maintenance of a male-only admissions
policy at Virginia Military Institute could be remedied if Virginia established a parallel institu-
tion for women, the Fourth Circuit in Faulkner ordered that the Citadel should first be permitted
a reasonable time to do the same. Faulkner v. Jones, 51 F.3d 440 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 938 (1995). In response to this decision, the Citadel filed a proposed plan to create a paral-
lel program at a pre-existing women's college. In the midst of challenges to the adequacy of this
plan, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in VMI 1, and in June 1996 issued a decision
that parallel programs are not an adequate to remedy equal protection violations. United States
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). Two days after the Supreme Court announced its decision, the
Citadel's Board of Visitors voted to end the male-only admissions policy and to admit women to
the Citadel's Corps of Cadet. Throughout the legal and social battle, Faulkner was vilified, and
targeted for harassment and ridicule. Playing on the Citadel mascot, the bulldog, alumni sold t-
shirts proclaiming "1952 Bulldogs and One Bitch"; graffiti in Citadel bathrooms included the
sentiment, "Let her in - then fuck her to death"; and in fact, she received death threats. SUSAN
FALUDI, STIFFED: THE BETRAYAL OF THE AMERICAN MAN 119 (1999); Rupert Cornwell, Knives
Sharpen for Haircut of the Century, INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 12, 1994, at 9. Four women
entered the Corps of Cadets in August 1996. In May 2002, the Citadel graduated its first Black
female cadets. Citadel Graduates First Black Female Cadets, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 9, 2002.
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sung at football games. 16 It was about Susan Smith, who claimed that
she had been carjacked by a Black man who had driven off with her
two children, and was believed, when in fact she herself had drowned
them in a lake. 7 It was about Denny's Restaurant, headquartered in
16. The Citadel finally discontinued its practice of singing Dixie at football games in 1992,
around the same time that Sports Illustrated devoted an article to the racism and hazing suffered
by [Bilacks at the Citadel. Geraldine Baum, Storming the Citadel for 151 Years, the State College
Has Been All Male. Thai Tradition May Fall if Shannon Faulkner Gets Her Way. Among Her
Big-Name Foes: South Carolina, L.A. TiMes, Feb. 13, 1994, at 1. The song, credited to Daniel
Decatur Emmett, a member of a group of minstrels who sang in blackface, was adopted by
Confederates and depicts Blacks as longing for a return to plantation life. Although contempo-
rary versions of the song omit the dialect, Emmett penned the song in "[B]lack dialect." Here is
an excerpt:
I wish I was in land ob cotton,
Old times dar am not forgotten,
Look away! Look away! Look away! Dixie Land.
In Dixie Land whar' I was born in,
Early on one frosty mornin',
Look away! Look away! Look away! Dixie Land.
CHORUS:
Den I wish I was in Dixie, Hoo-ray! Hoo-ray!
In Dixie land, I'll take my stand to lib and die in Dixie;
Away, away, away down south in Dixie,
Away, away, away down south in Dixie.
C.A. BROWNE, THE STORY OF ouR NATIONAL BALLADS 120-21 (1960). Although the Citadel
acknowledged the offensiveness of Dixie and discontinued singing the song at its football games
in 1992, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist apparently did not receive the memo. In 1999, Chief
Justice Rehnquist led a sing-along of Dixie at the fourth Circuit Judicial Conference, a gathering
of hundreds of federal judges from Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, and South
Carolina. Craig Timberg, Rehnquist's Inclusion of 'Dixie' Strikes a Sour Note, WASH. POST, July
22, 1999, at B1.
17. On October 25, 1994, police nationwide were asked to look for a car with South Caro-
lina tag GBK 167, after Susan Smith tearfully claimed that a [Bilack man in his 20s to early 30s
jumped into the front passenger seat of her car, brandished the barrel of a gun, and said, "Shut
up and drive or I'll kill you." The carjacker later forced her out, and drove off with her two
toddlers, Michael Daniel Smith and Alexander Tyler Smith, while Smith stood in the middle of
the road and screamed, "I love you all." Robert Davis, Prayers Lifted up for Abducted Boys,
Tots Whisked off in S.C. Carjacking, USA TODAY, Oct. 27, 1994, at 10A. While Smith spent
hours helping a police artist compose a sketch of the [Bilack man, and helicopters and planes
searched the back roads and woods of South Carolina, the boys' maternal grandfather urged
people to "lift up the names [of the boys] to the Lord-" Id. An FBI Supervisor described the
kidnapping as "the nation's nightmare," and vowed that the FBI was "amassing all the resources
we have nationwide." Robert Davis, Little to Go on but Hope in S.C.' Tots' Kidnapping, USA
TODAY, Oct. 28, 1994, at 3A. Black residents in Union, South Carolina were questioned as the
police went door to door looking for information, and several [B]lacks were detained. Gary Lee,
Black Residents Angered by Reaction to False Story: 'No One Has Rushed Forward to Apologize,'
WASH. POST. Nov. 7, 1994, at A10. Once found, the carjacker potentially faced the death
penalty.
In the end, the nation learned that Smith's carjacking claim was nothing more than a
fabrication. On November 3, 1994, Smith confessed to sending her toddlers, alive and strapped
in their car seats, into the waters of a lake to drown. As Professor Charles P. Ewing later noted,
Smith was able to fool the nation precisely because her story played to the "fears of the public
and the racism that fuels fear of crime in this country." Elizabeth Kastor, The Worst Fears, the
Worse Reality; for Parents, Murder Case Strikes at Heart of Darkness, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1994,
at Al; see also Eric Harrison, S. Carolina Case of Deceptions Also a Case of Perceptions Crime:
A Mother's Tale ofa Carjacker Is Now Seen as Another Example of Vilifying Black Men. But in
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Spartanburg, South Carolina, which, after settling a Justice Depart-
ment lawsuit"a and then two 1994 class action suits 9 alleging race dis-
crimination,20 now makes amends by contributing "[twenty] cents
from the sale of every All-American Slam® (at participating restau-
rants) to the King Center,"'" the National Civil Rights Museum in
Memphis, Tennessee. It was about the prohibition against interracial
dating at Bob Jones University in Greenville, South Carolina, where
President George W. Bush kicked off his 2000 presidential cam-
paign.22 It was about the grade schools in South Carolina, not to men-
the Tight-Knit Town, Cries of Racism are Tempered, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1994, at A27. At trial,
the jurors spared Smith the death penalty that her "fictitious" carjacker could have received.
Tamara Jones, Susan Smith Gets Life in Jail for Killing Sons, Death Penalty Wouldn't Serve Jus-
tice: Juror, CH. SUN-TiMES, July 29, 1995, at 1.
18. Benjamin A. Holden, Parent of Denny's Restaurants Signs Bias-Case Decree, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 26, 1993, at AS; Amy Stevens, Denny's Agrees to Alter Practices in Bias Settlement,
WALL Sr. J., Mar. 29, 1993, at A9 ("According to the Government, Denny's employees required
[B]lack patrons to show identification before being allowed to enter the restaurants; employees
removed some [Bilack patrons from restaurants without good cause... [and] [Bilacks-but not
[W]hites-were required to prepay for meals and to pay cover charges."). Just hours before a
federal court signed over the consent decree, patrons at a Denny's restaurant in Annapolis faced
discrimination. The patrons, six Black Secret Service agents preparing for a U.S. Naval Acad-
emy visit from President Clinton, ordered breakfast but were not served for more than an hour,
while a group of [Wihite Secret Service agents sitting at another table were served without delay.
The Black Secret Service agents left after an unsuccessful attempt to get an explanation from
management. Denny's employees then attempted to hide the fact that the six Secret Service
agents had complained. Peter Hermann, U.S. Agents Accuse Annapolis Restaurant of Racism -
Six Plan to File Suit Against Denny's, BALT. SUN, May 23, 1993, at lA.
19. See Dyson v. Flagstar Corp., C.A. No. 93 1503 (D. Md. 1994); Ridgeway v. Flagstar
Corp., Civ. No. 93-20202, 1994 WL 525553 (N.D. Cal. 1994); see also All Things Considered:
Denny's Tries to Clean up Image After Racial Bias Suits (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 22, 1994),
available at 1994 WL 8680234.
20. See McCoo v. Denny's, Inc., No. COV.A.98-2458RDR, 2000 WL 156824, at *1 (D. Kan.
2000); Savage v. Denny's Inc., No. Civ. A. 97-882, 1997 WL 169377, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Ron
Ruggless. 2000 Year in Review, 34 NATION'S RESTAURANT NEws 51 (2000); Chris Winston, Ad-
vantica President Steps Down, SPARTANBURG HERALD (South Carolina), Jan. 5, 2001, at Al
("[Tjhe 1,756 unit Denny's chain, a division of Advantica Restaurant Group, agreed to retrain
managers at company locations after facing U.S. Justice Department charges of discriminatory
hiring practices"). Denny's history of discrimination is so well known that it was recently com-
mented upon by the Sixth Circuit in reversing and remanding a district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Denny's. See Logan v. Denny's, Inc., 259 F.3d 558. 577 (6th Cir. 2001)
("Denny's past history of discriminatory conduct, both to its minority patrons and employees
alike, is well known in the jurisprudence and public forums.").
21. For more detail, see http://www.dennys.com/enPage.asp?PlD=5&lD=33#B].
22. Following public criticism over President Bush's visit, Bob Jones University modified its
blanket ban on interracial dating, and agreed to permit interracial dating so long as the student
first obtain written approval from his or her parents. Bob Jones U. Hasn't Changed, HARTFORD
COURANT, Mar. 16, 2000, at A18. Bob Jones University honorary degree recipients include At-
torney General John Ashcroft; upon accepting the degree in May 1999, Ashcroft reminded grad-
uating students that, "We have no king but Jesus," and "thank[ed] God" for the institution.
Libby Quaid, Liberals Examine Ashcroft Speech, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 13, 2001, at 14.




tion the churches and the cemeteries, still being segregated by race.23
It was about South Carolina refusing, until the flag controversy
erupted, to honor Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s contribution to civil
rights with an official holiday.24 It was about the shame White South
Carolinians felt upon learning that Senator Strom Thurmond, who
had once declared that "all the bayonets of the Army cannot force the
Negro into our homes," had fathered a Black daughter. It was about
housing subdivisions being named, to this day, wistfully, after
plantations.26
Thinking along these lines, and the unsuccessful grassroots and
legislative efforts of the NAACP to remove the flag, I began to won-
der about legal challenges to State displays of the flag,2 7 both through
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
In April of 1968 we had had a Bible conference that included Ian Paisley, the militant
northern Irishman, and at the end of a Saturday night, Bob Jones, Jr., got to the podium
and said "Martin Luther King, Jr. has just been shot in Memphis, Tennessee. The Presi-
dent has asked us to fly the flag at half-mast. We will not fly the flag at half-mast for an
apostate," at which time the audience clapped and cheered. I had never witnessed such
a racist act.
CAROLYN MARVIN & DAVID W. INGLE, BLOOD SACRIFICE AND THE NATION: TOTEM RITUALS
AND THE AMERICAN FLAG 56-62 (1999) (quoting interview of Denis MacDonald, in The Glory
and the Power: Fundamentalism Observed (WHYY television broadcast, June 1962)).
23. See, e.g., Cal Harrison, Herald Chronicles Century Of Racial Tension, HERALD (Rock
Hill, SC), Apr. 17, 1997, at 52D; Jennifer Talhelm, Race Line May Blur If Fort Mill Adds Ceme-
tery, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Nov. 18, 2001, at 12B.
24. B. Drummond Jr. Ayres, Campaign Briefing, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2000, at 24; S.C. to
Mark King Holiday, NEWSDAY, May 2, 2000, at A19. The bill recognizing Dr. King with a holi-
day also honored Confederate soldiers who fought to retain slavery by creating Confederate
Memorial Day.
25. The late Senator's niece, Mary T. Thompkins Freeman, has described the public an-
nouncement that Strom Thurmond fathered a child with a Black maid as "a blight on the fam-
ily." Ms. Freeman added, "I went to a church meeting the other day and all these people came
up to me and you could tell they didn't know what to say. For the first time in my life, I felt
shame." Ms. Freeman noted that had Thurmond secretly fathered a [W]hite child, "it would be a
whole other situation." Other family members questioned the daughter's motives for coming
forward, especially publicly, and feared that the existence of a Black relative would affect not
only Thurmond's legacy, but the political prospects of his descendants. Jeffrey Gettleman, Thur-
mond Family Struggles with Difficult Truth, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2003, at Al.
26. Derrick Bell, through his alter ego Geneva Crenshaw, notes that "minor matters"
should not be disregarded precisely because they
convey unintended signals to [B]lacks and [W]hites about how the Court weighs the
relative interests of the two races. The Court's inclination to avoid upsetting [W]hites
any more than is necessary, combined with its use of a standard of review that encour-
ages government officials to create "neutral" rules that everyone knows will disadvan-
tage [B]lacks, in effect creates a property right in [Wihiteness and the consequent loss
of some cases that we should by all rights win.
BELL, supra note 1, at 172.
27. My interest is limited to state displays of the Confederate flag. While I may personally
be offended by private persons who display the flag, I recognize, and respect, their right to do so.
Indeed, such private displays actually benefit me, in that they signify to me whom I should avoid
and not extend certain courtesies to, and permits me to redirect my business, and dollars and
cents-indeed, make that sense-elsewhere.
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through the Thirteen Amendment.2" My interest was limited to State
displays of the Confederate flag. While I may be personally offended
by private persons who display the flag, I recognize and respect their
right to do so. Indeed, such private displays actually benefit me, in
that they signify to me whom I should avoid and not extend certain
courtesies to, and permits me to redirect my business, and dollars and
cents-indeed, make that sense-elsewhere.
I quickly learned that there had been challenges elsewhere-in
Alabama in NAACP v. Hunt, 9 and in Georgia in Coleman v. Miller,3"
as well as numerous challenges to the removal of Confederate sym-
bols in public schools, 31 universities, 32 and cemeteries 33-and that
these challenges had failed. The more I examined these cases and the
scholarly responses to them,34 however, the more I became convinced
28. There have also been challenges to state displays of the Confederate flag on First
Amendment grounds, most recently in Briggs v. Mississippi, 331 F.3d 499 (5th Cir. 2003). There,
the court held that such displays neither violate the Establishment Clause under Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), nor contravene the First Amendment's right to free speech. See, e.g.,
Briggs, 331 F.3d at 505-08.
29. 891 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1990).
30. 912 F. Supp. 522 (N.D. Ga. 1996), affid, 117 F.3d 527 (11th Cir. 1997) (Coleman I).
31. In general, where there has been a showing of past disruption resulting from the display
of Confederate flags, courts have found school bans constitutional under Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). See, e.g., Scott v. Sch. Bd., 324 F.3d 1246, 1248-
49 (11th Cir. 2003); West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1365-1367 (10th Cir.
2000); Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332, 1335 (6th Cir. 1972); Phillips v. Anderson County Sch.
Dist. 5, 987 F. Supp. 488, 492 (D.S.C. 1997). In the absence of evidence of past disruption, courts
have generally concluded that school authorities have failed to establish a sufficient likelihood of
disruption to support banning the flag. See, e.g., Castorina v. Madison County Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d
536, 542-43 (6th Cir. 2001) (reversing summary judgment for school officials where there was no
showing of disruption); Denno v. Sch. Bd. of Volusia County, 182 F.3d 780, 785 (11th Cir. 1999),
vacated, and decided on separate grounds, 218 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2000) ("noting the absence of
any facts ... that would suggest a reasonable fear of disruption").
32. The University of Mississippi, for example, has been a locus of controversy. The
school's mascot, Colonel Rebel, is a personification of an Old South plantation owner; Dixie,
until recently, was sung at football games; the University's nickname, Ole Miss, is the slave term
for the [Wihite female head of a plantation. Until 1983, the University distributed Confederate
flags to fans at football games, and cheerleaders carried Confederate flags down the field. See
Ronald J. Rychlak, Civil Rights, Confederate Flags, and Political Corrections: Free Speech and
Race Relations on Campus, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1411, 1413-16 (1992).
33. See, e.g., Griffin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 274 F.3d 818, 824 (4th Cir. 2001) (declar-
ing Department of Veteran's Affairs's decision to limit the display of the Confederate flag at
National Cemetery reasonable and viewpoint neutral under the First Amendment).
34. See, e.g., Robert J. Bein, Stained Flags: Public Symbols and Equal Protection, 28 SETON
HALL L. REV. 897 (1998) (applying reception theory to argue that State displays of Confederate
flag have a discriminatory effect); James Forman, Jr., Note, Driving Dixie Down: Removing the
Confederate Flag from Southern State Capitols, 101 YALE L.J. 505 (1991) (arguing that state
displays violate First and Fourteenth Amendments); Alexander Tsesis, The Problem of Confed-
erate Symbols: A Thirteenth Amendment Approach, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 539 (2002) (arguing that




that something was missing from the analysis. Although the cases cur-
sorily addressed the historiography surrounding the display of the
flag, the decisions were silent when it came to any analysis of the
power associated with this display.
Replicating my own heuristic approach to this issue, in Part I, I
review the Equal Protection challenges to state displays of the Con-
federate flag that have been mounted to date, paying particular atten-
tion to the cursory manner in which federal courts have addressed the
plurality of meanings behind the flag itself. In Part II, I offer a reread-
ing of the cases by, among other means, examining them in light of
current juridical approaches to analyzing Equal Protection claims, and
I argue that the cases, by effect if not design, perpetuate social
inequality.
Returning to the plurality of meanings35 in the Confederate flag,
in Part III, I attempt to "thicken" the analysis by mapping out not
only what the Confederate flag denotes, but also what the Confeder-
ate flag connotes. Though perhaps unconventional, I consider the
Confederate flag against the backdrop of flags in general. In doing so,
I consider the Confederate flag as an iconic metaphor, as conveying
messages implicating protection, allegiance, and stasis. I attempt to
concretize my analysis by imagining other flags that could be dis-
played by States and how challenges to those flags would likely fare.
In Part IV, I offer a retelling of Derrick Bell's Chronicle of the Space
Traders, and explore how the Confederate flag functions as an assur-
ance of how any proposal that pits the interests of the minority against
interests of the majority will be resolved. Finally, in Part V, I explore
how the view of the Confederate flag as a signifier of protection, alle-
giance, and stasis could strengthen future challenges to the govern-
ment-sponsored display of the Confederate flag.
36
35. 1 am not suggesting here that there is any meaning immanent in the Confederate flag, or
in any other flag for that matter. In semiotic terms, flags, like words, are simply signifiers, and
the various meanings associated with them are signifieds that otherwise bear no relation to what
they signify. See generally FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS
(Charles Bally et al. eds., Open Court Publ'g Co. 1986) (1916). Nor am I suggesting that the
signifieds or meanings, associated with any particular flag are fixed. As the literary theorist
Mikhail Bakhtin has emphasized, signs are inherently "dialogic," modified and transformed in
meaning by differing social tones, valuations, and connotations assigned to them by a heteroge-
neous society composed of conflicting interests and views. M. M. BAKHTIN & P.N. MEDVEDEV,
THE FORMAL METHOD IN LITERARY SCHOLARSHIP: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGI-
CAL POETICS (Albert J. Wehrle trans., 1928). What I am suggesting is that flags, because they are
so imbricated with history, social convention, and mythology, are particularly polysemic.
36. This is not to suggest that the removal of the Confederate flag would have an immediate
transformative effect on states such as South Carolina. History suggests that judicial decisions
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I. FLAGS: THE EQUAL PROTECTION CASES
To date, two federal appellate courts have considered Equal Pro-
tection challenges to State displays of the Confederate flag.
A. NAACP v. Hunt
In 1988, the NAACP and several of its Alabama members filed
suit in the Middle District of Alabama against Governor Guy Hunt
and other state officials (the "State"), seeking declaratory judgment
that the flying of the Confederate flag atop the Alabama capitol dome
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
as well as the First and Thirteenth Amendments. The District Court
dismissed the case on procedural grounds, 37 and on appeal, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Eleventh
Circuit, however, elected not to rest its dismissal solely on procedural
grounds, noting instead that because of the "controversial concerns,"
it was "important that all issues be laid to rest on the merits.
38
Turning to the merits, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that while
the NAACP had satisfied the first prong for stating a cause of action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by establishing that the Confederate flag was
flown by individuals acting under the cloak of State authority,39 the
NAACP could not satisfy the second prong, which required a depriva-
tion of some right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution
or by law.4 ° Relying on Hunter v. Underwood,4 1 in which the Supreme
Court held that facially neutral state action will violate the Equal Pro-
rarely result in social change. See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 56-
62 (1977); R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURT: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR
ACT 110-12 (1983). As Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. L. REv. 751, 765
(1991) has pointed out. Brown v. Board of Education may be the "most conspicuous confirma-
tion of the point." Despite the Supreme Court's mandate that states desegregate public schools
"with all deliberate speed," ten years after the decision, only about two percent of Black children
in the South attended desegregated schools. Id.; see also G. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 474 (1986). That being said, I am suggesting that removal of the flag can catalyze change.
37. Specifically, the district court dismissed the NAACP's claims as precluded by res judi-
cata. NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, at 1561 (11 th Cir. 1990). The dismissal was based on the
fact that several years earlier, in 1975, one of the Hunt plaintiffs, Alabama State Legislator Alvin
Holmes, had filed a nearly identical action in Holmes v. Wallace. 407 F. Supp. 493 (M.D. Ala.
1976), affd without published opinion, 540 F.2d 1083 (5th Cir. 1976). There, the district court
had dismissed Holmes's claims based on the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, finding
that while a "[sitate sponsored display of the Confederate flag may offend sensitive descendants
of former slaves," Holmes's "embarrassment and humiliation in the absence of some recognized
right to liberty or property" was insufficient to allow recovery. Holmes, 407 F. Supp. at 497-98
(emphasis added).
38. Hunt, 891 F.2d at 1561-62.
39. Id. at 1562 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184-87 (1961)).
40. Id. at 1562-63 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
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tection Clause only if: (1) the state action was motivated, at least in
part, by racial animus; and (2) the state action produced a dispropor-
tionate effect along racial lines, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate racial animus. Noting that the
record revealed "two accounts of why Alabama flies the flag," only
one of which suggested animus,4 2 the Eleventh Circuit declined to find
that the flag was hoisted for racially discriminatory reasons. The Elev-
enth Circuit then summarily dismissed the NAACP's claim that "the
flag was 'tantamount to holding public property for racially discrimi-
natory purposes' and that it denied its members their rights to equal
education, equal economic opportunity, and equal protection. '4 3 In-
stead, the Eleventh Circuit concluded "there is no unequal application
of the state policy; all citizens are exposed to the flag. Citizens of all
races are offended by its position.""
Finally, in what can be described as an ad hominem attack, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that the NAACP had been advancing discrimi-
nation suits in federal and state courts "over the [twenty-five] years
since the flag was raised," and had never before requested that it be
brought down.45
41. 471 U.S. 222 (1985). Underwood involved a challenge to an Alabama law disenfranchis-
ing persons convicted of "any crime ... involving moral turpitude." Id, at 223 (quoting ALA.
CoNsT. art. VIII, § 182). Historical evidence indicated that the law was enacted to disen-
franchise Blacks, and in fact accomplished its goal. As such, the Court concluded that it de-
prived Blacks of equal protection. Id. at 225.
42. Hunt, 891 F.2d at 1562. Here, the Eleventh Circuit was clearly attempting to transform
what it had earlier identified as the "two occasions" that Alabama had raised the flag into "two
accounts" for raising the flag. Id. at 1558. The two occasions were as follows: Alabama raised
the flag in 1961 ostensibly for the purpose of commemorating the one-hundreth anniversary of
the Civil War. Id. The second time Alabama raised the flag was in 1963 in response to efforts to
desegregate the University of Alabama. Governor George Wallace had threatened to physically
block the admission of newly matriculated Black students to the University. On the morning of
April 25, 1963, the day that U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy traveled to Alabama to
confront Wallace, Alabama hoisted the flag in a show of defiance. Id.
43. Id. at 1562.
44. Id.
45. The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the NAACP's remaining claims. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit noted that while the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the authority to enact legisla-
tion to eradicate badges and incidents of slavery, Congress had not used this authority to pass
legislation forbidding the flying of the Confederate flag, precluding the NAACP's Thirteenth
Amendment claim. Id. at 1564.
The Eleventh Circuit also rejected as meritless the NAACP's contention that, given the Ku
Klux Klan's use of the flag "as part of their religious rituals," Alabama's flying of the Confeder-
ate flag amounted to excessive entanglement with religion. Applying the three-prong test estab-
lished in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), which held that a state practice is
valid under the Establishment Clause if (1) it has a secular legislative purpose; (2) its principal or
primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does not foster excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion, the Eleventh Circuit concluded:
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Having elected to lay "to rest on the merits" the claims raised by
the NAACP, the Eleventh Circuit concluded by electing to insulate
itself from accountability by passing the buck:
It is unfortunate that the State of Alabama chooses to utilize its
property in a manner that offends a large proportion of its popula-
tion, but that is a political matter which is not within our province to
decide. The remedy for such a grievance lies within the democratic
processes of the State of Alabama and the voting rights of all its
citizens, "the restraints on which the people must often rely solely,
in all representative governments.,
46
B. Coleman v. Miller
Seven years after the Eleventh Circuit claimed to lay to rest the
"controversial concerns"" raised in the NAACP's challenge to Ala-
bama's display of the Confederate flag, it was presented with another
challenge, this time to the constitutionality of the state flag of Geor-
gia.4 8 At the time, Georgia's state flag consisted of the Georgia state
seal, which covered approximately a third of the flag, and the Confed-
erate battle flag emblem, which covered the remaining two-thirds.4 9
In a civil rights action filed in the Northern District of Georgia under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, James Coleman, an African American resident of
Georgia, had challenged the legislation establishing the flag and the
flag's design on several grounds, including the ground that it violated
his constitutional rights to equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 50
It is clear that whether the flag was hoisted to decry integration or to recognize history,
the purpose in its hoisting was secular. It is also clear that the primary effect of the flag
is not to promote religion: rather, it is to remind citizens, albeit offensively to some, of a
controversial era in American history .... Finally, the NAACP has produced no evi-
dence that the flag constitutes excessive entanglement with religion .. . .Without
meaningful evidence of purpose, effect, and entanglement, the Establishment Clause
claim must fail.
Hunt, 891 F.2d at 1564-65. Finally, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the NAACP's claim that Ala-
bama's display of the Confederate flag either interfered with the NAACP's free speech, or
amounted to improper "government speech" or "'monopolization of the marketplace of ideas."'
id. at 1565-66.
46. Hunt, 891 F.2d at 1566 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)).
47. Id. at 1561.
48. Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527 (11th Cir. 1997) (Coleman H). Coleman, an African
American resident of Georgia, brought his civil right action challenging the flag, and seeking an
injunction ordering the immediate removal of the Georgia flag from all state office buildings in
Georgia, in 1994. Id. at 524-25.
49. Id. at 528.
50. Id. Coleman also claimed that Georgia's incorporation of the Confederate battle flag
compelled him "to be the courier of an ideological message to which he objects," in violation of
his rights to freedom of expression and association under the First Amendment; deprived "him
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At an evidentiary hearing before the District Court, Coleman
presented evidence detailing the "historical incidents leading to
the .. flag's enactment,"5 1 which included the following:
In [May] 1954, the [U.S.] Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board
of Education, holding that racial segregation in public schools vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause. Later that year, Georgia voters
[reacting to Brown I] ratified a constitutional amendment allowing
parents to withdraw their children from public schools and [permit-
ting the state legislature to] divert[ ] public money to nonsectarian,
segregated schools.
In April 1955, John Sammons Bell, counsel to the County Com-
missioners Association of Georgia and Chairman of the State Dem-
ocratic Party, [proposed modifying Georgia's state flag]. . . . to
incorporate the Confederate battle flag ....
In May 1955, the Supreme Court decided [Brown H, requiring]
states to desegregate public schools "with all deliberate speed."
[Brown II ] fomented great controversy and deep emotion in Geor-
gia. Politicians, including Governor Marvin Griffin, advanced a pol-
icy of massive resistance to desegregation in response.
[In August 1955, in a further response to Brown 1 and Brown
II,] the Georgia School Board ordered all teachers belonging to the
[NAACP] to resign from the organization or have their teaching li-
censes revoked.
[In August 1955 Georgia's] State Attorney General ... advo-
cat[ed] the doctrine of interposition .... maintain[ing] that states
may interpose themselves to block the enforcement of unconstitu-
tional mandates such as Brown....
In December 1955,.... Georgia['s] ... Board of Regents...
passed a resolution . . . [prohibiting Georgia Tech's football team
from] play[ing] . . intrastate games against teams with [B]lack
players.
[In January 1956,] .... [i]n his ... state of the State address,
Governor Griffin ... [promised, among other things, the following:]
of his fundamental privacy interest in intimate associations with Caucasians free from Govern-
ment intrusion," in violation of his Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and
intimidated him and other African Americans "into refraining from exercising their right to
vote" in violation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 19"71. Coleman v. Miller, 912 F.
Supp. 522, 530-32 (N.D. Ga. 1996), affTd, 117 F.3d 527 (11th Cir. 1997) (Coleman I). The District
Court rejected each of these claims as meritless, and only the Equal Protection and Freedom of
Expression claims were addressed on appeal. See id.
51. Coleman 1, 912 F. Supp. at 525.
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"[T]here will be no mixing of the races in public schools, in
college classrooms in Georgia as long as I am the governor. I cam-
paigned with segregation as the number one plank in my platform.
We must not desert future generations of Georgians. We must
never surrender. All attempts to mix the races, whether they be in
the classrooms, on the playgrounds, in public conveyances, or in any
other close personal contact on terms of equality harrow the mores
of the South."
In... February 1956, [State] Senator Willis Harden sponsored a bill
to adopt ... [a] new design for the state flag....
The bill passed 107 to 32, to 61 abstentions.
5 2
Having accepted this factual history, the district court nonetheless
bypassed the racial animus prong of Hunter53 and granted Georgia's
motion for summary judgment on the second prong of Hunter,
namely, that Coleman had failed to show that Georgia's display of the
flag had resulted in a "concrete, present-day discriminatory impact on
African[ ]Americans. ' '54 Although Coleman argued that he suffered
certain intangible harms,55 and that under Brown disparate harm need
"not be specifically identifiable but may amount to feelings of inferi-
ority such that they cause harm to the African[ ]American commu-
nity,"5 6 the district court rejected this claim and distinguished Brown
on the ground that the statute at issue there was not facially neutral,
but explicitly classified children on the basis of race.5 7
52. Coleman 1, 912 F. Supp. at 526-28. The district court noted that nothing in the legisla-
tive record of the bill, which is codified at O.C.G.A. § 50-3-1, revealed any discussion of segrega-
tion or White supremacy. Id. at 528. A likely explanation for this omission, however, is that
segregation and White supremacy were taken as a given. The district court did acknowledge that
segregation was a focus of the remainder of the 1956 session of the General Assembly. The
District Court noted:
Of the 150 acts passed in the session, ten bills and two resolutions dealt with massive
resistance to desegregation. One such law passed after the flag bill, the Interposition
Resolution, declared the Brown cases and all similar decisions to be null and void.
Finding that the Supreme Court had usurped powers reserved to the states in Brown, it
repudiated the Court's right to declare state laws unconstitutional. It also asserted that
Georgia had the right to decide for itself how to educate its children in keeping with the
State's segregated social structure. The resolution passed with twenty-five abstentions
and only one dissent.
Id.
53. Coleman 1, 912 F. Supp. at 530.
54. Id. at 529.
55. In an attempt to satisfy the disparate impact prong of Hunter, Coleman claimed that the
flag's existence called upon Georgia citizens to adopt the "symbolic state policy of discrimina-
tion" and resulted in his devaluing himself as a person. Coleman 1, 912 F. Supp. at 529-30. The
district court found neither of these contentions persuasive. Id.




On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant
of summary judgment to the State of Georgia, concluding that Cole-
man had failed to satisfy Hunter by presenting "specific factual evi-
dence to demonstrate that the Georgia flag presently imposes on
African[ ]Americans, as a group, a measurable burden or denies them
an identifiable benefit." 8
Appellant relies on his own testimony to demonstrate a dispropor-
tionate racial effect. He testified that the Confederate symbol in
the Georgia flag places him in imminent fear of lawlessness and vio-
lence and that an African[ ]American friend of his, upon seeing the
Georgia flag in a courtroom, decided to plead guilty rather than liti-
gate a traffic ticket. This anecdotal evidence of intangible harm to
two individuals, without any evidence regarding the impact upon
other African[ ]American citizens or the comparative effect of the
flag on [W]hite citizens, is insufficient to establish "disproportionate
effects along racial lines."59
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Coleman faced the same,
presumably insurmountable, hurdle as the plaintiff had in NAACP v.
Hunt: "'[Tihere is no unequal application of state policy; all citizens
are exposed to the flag. Citizens of all races are offended by its
position.' "60
Finally, as it had done before in Hunt, the Eleventh Circuit at-
tempted to insulate itself from criticism by expressing its disagreement
with Georgia's decision to fly the flag, while simultaneously disclaim-
ing any authority to order the removal of the flag:
We recognize that the Georgia flag conveys mixed meanings; to
some it honors those who fought in the Civil War and to others it
flies as a symbol of oppression. But because the Confederate battle
58. Coleman 1I, 117 F.3d at 530.
59. Id. (quoting Hunter, 471 U.S. at 227). Coleman's fear of "lawlessness and violence" is
not entirely farfetched. The Confederate flag has been embraced not only by members of the Ku
Klux Klan and neo-Nazis, but by other supremacists groups as well. See Forman, Jr., supra note
34, at 526 n.57 (citing examples of various supremacists invoking the Confederate flag); L.
Darnell Weeden, How to Establish Flying the Confederate Flag with the State as Sponsor Violates
the Equal Protection Clause, 34 AKRON L. REV. 521, 553 n.64 (2001). More recently, federal
agents who searched serial bombing suspect Eric Robert Rudolph's storage unit in 1998 found
"guns, ammunition.., and Confederate flags." Rudolph was subsequently arrested on May 31,
2003, after a much publicized, five-year manhunt, and is awaiting capital trial in federal court in
Alabama in connection with the 1998 bombing of an abortion clinic there. Rudolf also faces
charges in Georgia, in connection with three bombings there, including one at the 1996 Olym-
pics. Don Plummer, Rudolph Caches Revealed Items Seized Expand Portrait of Bomb Suspect,
ATLANTA J. CONST., July 1, 2003, at A5.




flag emblem offends many Georgians, it has, in our view, no place in
the official state flag. We regret that the Georgia legislature has
chosen, and continues to display, as an official state symbol a battle
flag emblem that divides rather than unifies the citizens of Georgia.
As judges, however, we are entrusted only to examine the contro-
versies and facts put before us.
6 1
II. FLAGS: THE JURIDICAL PERPETUATION OF
SOCIAL INEQUALITY
That the Eleventh Circuit decisions in Hunt and Coleman are as-
sailable on a number of grounds perhaps goes without saying. That
some greater showing of harm-a "concrete, present-day discrimina-
tory impact on African[ ]Americans" 62-must be proved where a stat-
ute is facially neutral, as opposed to discriminatory on its face, is far
from apodictic. One need only look at the district court's "facially
neutral" recitation of the "facts" adduced at the evidentiary hearings
to see how easily race can be alluded to without being stated.
Throughout the district court's recitation, racial identification is ubiq-
uitous, a given, and yet at the same time absent. Thus, the district
court was able to note the "public outcry to desegregation," 63 "voters
ratif[ying] a constitutional amendment allowing parents to withdraw
their children from public schools,"' 6 4 and "[p]oliticians advanc[ing] a
policy of massive resistance to desegregation,"65 without once needing
to identify the race of the actors.66 Indeed, during the Civil Rights
Era, states routinely responded to judicial invalidations of racially ex-
plicit legislation by purposefully enacting facially neutral, yet discrimi-
61. Id. at 530. One effect of this assertion of the court's "view" is that it provides support
for the court's earlier claim, not based on any evidence in the record, that "all races are offended
by" Georgia's display of the flag. The judges on the three-member panels that decided NAACP
v. Hunt and Coleman v. Miller were all White men. Notwithstanding the fact that African Amer-
icans comprise approximately twenty percent of the Eleventh Circuit, there has never been more
than one African American judge at a time on the Eleventh Circuit. See generally Report on
Presidential Appointments of African American Article III Judges, available at www.jtbf.org
(last visited Oct. 4, 2004).
62. Coleman 1, 912 F. Supp. at 529.
63. Id. at 526.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 527.
66. Id. Race is similarly a given in Governor Griffin's 1956 state of the State Address, as
the following rewrite demonstrates: "I campaigned with segregation as the number one plank in
my platform. We [Whites] must not desert future generations of [White] Georgians. We
[Whites] must never surrender." Id.
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natory, laws.67 Given the fact that it is relatively easy to cloak racially
motivated legislation in facially neutral language,68 there seems little
basis for imposing a more stringent standard in challenges to facially
neutral statutes. 69 Indeed, as Darren Lenard Hutchinson has convinc-
ingly argued, requiring proof of racial animus departs from the spirit
of the Equal Protection Clause, as explicated by law's most famous
footnote,70 and contributes to what Hutchinson identifies as the "in-
version of privilege and subordination in Equal Protection jurispru-
dence.'7 1  Put differently, under Hutchinson's theory, Hunt and
Coleman can be read as belonging to a growing body of cases in which
courts, having extended solicitude to the discrimination claims
brought by members of privileged classes in "reverse discrimination"
cases, find claims of discrimination deficient when brought by mem-
67. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Swaun, 402 U.S. 43 (1971) (prohibiting busing enacted to
thwart integration); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (excluding all but four Black
voters from the city); see also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977) (zoning decision); Kimberle' Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1337-38
(1988) (discussing the de jure manifestation of subordination that existed prior to the Civil
Rights movement).
68. As the Supreme Court has noted:
It is difficult or impossible for any court to determine the "sole" or "dominant" motiva-
tion behind the choices of a group of legislators. Furthermore, there is an element of
futility in a judicial attempt to invalidate a law because of the bad motives of its sup-
porters. If the law is struck down for this reason, rather than because of its facial con-
tent or effect, it would presumably be valid as soon as the legislature or relevant
governing body repassed it for different reasons.
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971).
69. See, e.g., Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitu-
tional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95 (1971); John Hart Ely, Legislative and Adminis-
trative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); Seth F. Kreimer, Reading the
Mind of the School Board: Segregative Intent and the De Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J.
317 (1976); Eric Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Discrimination, 96 HARV. L. Rev. 828 (1983);
David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Cii. L. REv. 935, 948
(1989) (arguing that "[i]f explicit racial classifications are unlawful, it makes little sense to allow
a government that is subtle enough to use an ostensibly neutral surrogate for race to get away
with maintaining the Jim Crow regime").
70. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The footnote reads,
in relevant part:
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes
directed at particular religious, . . . or national .. .or racial minorities .. . whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be re-
lied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more search-
ing judicial inquiry.
Id.
71. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race": The Inver-




bers of historically vulnerable classes-the very persons that the
Equal Protection Clause was drafted to protect.72
Similarly, one could quarrel with the Eleventh Circuit's adoption
of an Equal Protection test based on anti-differentiation, rather than
anti-subordination or equal citizenship.7 3 Under the anti-differentia-
tion standard, exemplified by Washington v. Davis,74 courts invalidate
only those government actions that make explicit and purposeful dis-
tinctions between similarly situated groups. By contrast, under an
anti-subordination approach, exemplified in Brown J,76 the constitu-
tionality of a law is not determined by simply examining whether it
differentiates among similarly situated classes; rather, a law unlawfully
discriminates if it reinforces the marginalized social, economic, or po-
litical status of historically disadvantaged classes.77 In the alternative,
the Eleventh Circuit could have adopted the equal citizenship ap-
proach advocated by scholars such as Kenneth Karst, 78 and exempli-
72. Id. at 671.
73. For a general discussion of the various meanings of equality that scholars and jurists
have advanced in the context of equal protection analysis, see id. at 619-27.
74. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In Washington v. Davis, plaintiffs challenged on equal protection
grounds the requirement of an aptitude test to gain employment with the Washington, District of
Columbia police department. Finding that the test was applied equally to all applicants, and
rejecting statistical evidence of disproportionate pass/failure rates, the Court found the test
constitutional.
75. See generally Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protec-
tion, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1005 (1986) (describing the anti-differentiation approach as pre-
cluding only different treatment on the basis of a particular normative view about race or sex);
see also Cedric Merlin Powell. Blinded by Color: The New Equal Protection, the Second Decon-
struction, and Affirmative Inaction, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 191, 228 (1997).
76. 347 U.S. at 483 ("To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."); see also Michael C.
Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation. 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 76 (1998) (noting that
Brown "has been most persuasively defended as the Court's recognition that, as actually prac-
ticed, American segregation was a crucial piece of a system of racial subordination").
77. See Colker, supra note 76; Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 Mtci. L. REV.
2410, 2411 (1994); Robin L. West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45, 71 (1990) (advocating an "anti-subordination model,
which targets legislation that substantially contributes to the subordination of one group by
another").
78. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term Foreword: Equal Citizenship
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1977) [hereinafter Karst, Equal
Citizenship].
The principle of equal citizenship presumptively insists that the organized society treat
each individual as a person, one who is worthy off respect, one who "belongs." Stated
negatively, the principle presumptively forbids the organized society to treat an individ-
ual either as a member of an inferior or dependent caste or as a nonparticipant. Ac-
cordingly, the principle guards against degradation or the imposition of stigma.
Id. at 6. See generally KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND
THE CONSTITUTION (1989); KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S EXPRESSION: VISIONS
OP POWER IN THE POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION (1993).
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fied by Lawrence v. Texas7 9 and even more recently in the
Massachusetts Supreme Court's decision Goodridge v. Dept. of Public
Health.8" Under Karst's theory, the Equal Protection Clause autho-
rizes courts to invalidate laws that reduce groups to "second-class citi-
zenship." Karst argues:
The essence of equal citizenship is the dignity of full membership in
the society. Thus, the principle not only demands a measure of
equality of legal status, but also promotes a greater equality of that
other kind of status which is a social fact - namely, one's rank on a
scale defined by degrees of deference or regard. The principle em-
bodies "an ethic of mutual respect and self-esteem;" it often bears
its fruit in those regions where symbol becomes substance.
81
Thus, by applying a test based on anti-differentiation, rather than
anti-subordination or equal citizenship, the Eleventh Circuit was able
to ensure a result that was all but predetermined to sustain social and
racial hierarchy.
One could also take issue with the Eleventh Circuit's application
of the discriminatory impact prong of Hunter, and its statement, first
made in Hunt and reiterated in Coleman, that citizens of all races are
offended by the Confederate flag, and the implicit suggestion that
such citizens are offended equally. The Eleventh Circuit offered no
empirical support for this supposition; and indeed, their conclusion
runs contrary to polls reflecting the public's responses to the flag.'
2
Moreover, as demonstrated by Justice Clarence Thomas's statements
during oral argument in Virginia v. Black,8 3 which involved a First
Amendment challenge to a Virginia statute criminalizing cross burn-
ing, the targets of symbols of supremacy justifiably feel offended to a
greater degree than even their most liberal sympathizers.8 4 For exam-
79. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating Texas's anti-sodomy law as infringing on the right to
liberty under the Due Process Clause).
80. 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (reading the Massachusetts Constitution's guarantees
of equality before the law as "forbid[ding] the creation of second-class citizens," and thus pre-
cluding the denial of the civil marriage benefits to same-sex couples); see also In re Opinion of
the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004).
81. Karst, Equal Citizenship, supra note 78, at 5-6.
82. Cf. infra note 88.
83. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
84. As one commentator described it:
[N]early midway through the hour-long hearing, Justice Clarence Thomas transformed
the debate with his booming and rarely heard voice, cautioning government lawyers
against "understating the effects of burning crosses." Cross burning was part and par-
cel of "100 years of lynching in the South," Thomas said, adding that "this was a reign
of terror." Burning a cross, he said, is "intended to have a virulent effect. It is unlike
any other symbol."
Tony Mauro, Remarks by Thomas Alter Argument, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 16, 2002, at 7.
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pie, it would be irrational for a non-minority to fear physical assault
from an approaching group waving Confederate flags. By contrast,
given the history of violence associated with the Confederate flag,85 it
would be entirely rational for a member of a historically oppressed
class, in the face of the same approaching group, to fear for his safety.
This is not to suggest that the plaintiffs in Hunt and Coleman
mounted the strongest cases imaginable. Ultimately, the Eleventh
Circuit was able to point to the plaintiffs' failure to present "specific
factual evidence" to refute the court's assessment that the Confeder-
ate flag imposes no disproportionate effect along racial lines. Rather
than relying on empirical data or expert testimony and reports from
sociologists, as the NAACP had done to great effect in Brown,86 the
plaintiffs in Hunt and Coleman instead relied on personal, anecdotal
evidence. One could argue that the failure on the part of the plaintiffs
to present data supporting their claim of disparate impact was fatal,
though whether the Eleventh Circuit would have been receptive to, or
persuaded by, such data is questionable.8
One could also argue that by deferring to the state legislature,
which by definition is majoritarian, the Eleventh Circuit abdicated its
function of protecting "discrete and insular minorities. '"" Stated dif-
85. Several violent White supremacist groups have adopted the Confederate battle flag as
their symbol. See, e.g., Ashley Dunn & Jeffrey Miller, '1 Had to Stop it,' Says Guard Who Held
off Alleged "Skinheads," L.A. TIMES, June 1, 1989, at BI (A group of Los Angeles skinheads
wearing Confederate battle flag tattoos attacked a Middle Eastern couple and baby in a super-
market parking lot.); John M. Glionna, Unfavorite Son, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1990, at El (Tom
Metzgcr, former Grand Dragon of the KKK and leader of the White Aryan Resistance, who was
ordered to pay $12.5 million in damages for his role in the killing of a Black man in Oregon, flew
the Confederate battle flag above his home.); Peggy O'Hare, Task Force Reveals Arrests of Four
After Infiltration of Bandidos Gang, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 11, 2000, at 21A (gang displayed
swastikas and Confederate flag); Paul W. Valentine, Police Boost Security at NAACP; White
Supremacists Picket Headquarters, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1990, at C1 (KKK and neo-Nazi protes-
tors demonstrating outside the national headquarters of the NAACP carried a Confederate bat-
tle flag along with signs saying "Nuke the NAACP.").
86. See generally MARK TUSHNET, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION. THE BATTLE FOR
INGrEOATION (1995); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN v. BOARD
OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EOUALITY (1975).
87. For example, the Supreme Court found unpersuasive statistical data evidencing a racial
pattern in the imposition of the death penalty in Georgia. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279
(1987). For a general discussion of the Supreme Court's rejection of discriminatory impact sta-
tistics in Equal Protection actions, see Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV.
1065, 1144-61 (1998).
88. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980) (invoking footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 US. 144,
152 n.4 (1938), to explicate a process-based theory of judicial review to protect disadvantaged
minorities, who by definition are subject to the will of the majority in a majoritarian legislative
process); see also Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV, L. REv. 713, 716 n.
5 (1985); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1087 (1982).
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ferently, Hunt and Coleman can be read as a failure of
countermajoritism. Instead of protecting the interests of "insular mi-
norities" from the majoritarianism of representative government, as
envisioned under the late John Hart Ely's model of judicial review,
the Eleventh Circuit instead protected the preferences of the majority.
Indeed, scholars such as Charles Lawrence and Girardeau A. Spann
would argue that the failure of counter-majoritarianism is all but inev-
itable in such cases, given that judges, through the nomination and
confirmation process, usually arrive at the bench already "inculcated
with majoritarian values."8 9
Specifically, Spann persuasively argues that Supreme Court Jus-
tices are, by necessity, majoritarian, in the sense that they have been
socialized by the dominant culture. His argument has equal force
when applied to other federal judges:
[Judges] have internalized the basic values and assumptions of [the]
culture, including the beliefs and predispositions that can cause the
majority to discount minority interests. Indeed, a justice's sympathy
toward majoritarian values is thoroughly tested by the appointment
and confirmation process, which is specifically designed to eliminate
any candidate whose political inclinations are not sufficiently cen-
trist for the majoritarian branches to feel comfortable with that can-
didate's likely judicial performance. As a statistical matter,
therefore, a [federal judge] is more likely to share the majority's
views about proper resolution of a given social issue than to possess
any other view on that issue. Moreover, to the extent that the jus-
tice has been socialized to share majoritarian prejudices, he .. . may
not even be consciously aware of the nature of those prejudices, or
the degree to which they influence the exercise of the [judge's] dis-
cretion. Whatever factors cause majority undervaluation of minor-
ity interests, [judges] socialized by the dominant culture will have
been influenced by them too. Accordingly, justices will come to the
task of protecting minority interests possessed by the very same dis-
positions that they are asked to guard against.90
Finally, one could argue that the Eleventh Circuit was either na-
ive or disingenuous in urging the plaintiffs to seek recourse in the leg-
islative arena. The simple fact is that efforts by minorities to obtain
relief in the legislatures have proved unavailing, and will in all likeli-
89. Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 1982 (1990) [hereinafter
Spann, Pure Politics]; see also GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT (1983);
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
90. Spann, Pure Politics, supra note 89, at 1982-83.
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hood continue to prove unavailing. 91 As Reinhold Niebuhr noted, in-
sular minorities cannot expect "complete emancipation from the
menial social and economic position into which the [Wihite man has
forced him, merely by trusting in the moral sense of the [W]hite
race."
92
On another level, however, Hunt and Coleman suffer from a fail-
ure of context. After all, how can one decide whether the state dis-
play of the Confederate flag violates the Equal Protection Clause,
without first considering what it means for the State to display a flag?
III. FLAGS: THE POLEMICAL FLAG
"You might ask mockingly: 'A flag? What's that? A stick with a rag
on it?' No sir, a flag is much more. With a flag you lead men, for a
flag, men live and die. In fact, it is the only thing for which they are
ready to die in masses, if you train them for it. Believe me, the
politics of an entire people.., can be manipulated only through the
imponderables that float in thin air."
93
Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas.
The use of an emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, insti-
tution, or personality, is a short cut from mind to mind.94
I am what you make me; nothing more. I swing before your eyes as
a bright gleam of color, a symbol of yourself.
95
In the collection of the Staten Island Historical Society, there is a
thirty-four-star American flag that has an interesting, if apocryphal,
history. According to legend, during the period of the Civil War, a
Confederate sympathizer made the mistake of hanging a Confederate
flag from the window of the Staten Island boarding house where he
was staying. An angry mob quickly gathered, forcibly removed the
Confederate flag, and threatened to burn the house to embers unless
91. For example, in 2001, a referendum was put to the voters in Mississippi on removing the
Confederate emblem from the state flag. The removal was easily defeated, with only thirty-five
percent of voters supporting the removal. At the time, Mississippi was thirty-six percent Black.
Nicholas Dawidoff, Mr. Washington Goes to Mississippi, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2003, at 48.
92. REINHOLD NIEBURH, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY, A STUDY IN ETHICS AND
POLITICS 252 (1932).
93. Theodore Herzl, regarded as the founder of modern Zionism, wrote these words to a
German friend who had questioned the significance of flags. ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, SAV-
ING "OLD GLORY": THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FLAG DESECRATION CONTROVERSY iX
(1995) (omission in original) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN, FLAG DESECRATION].
94. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) (Justice Jackson holding
unconstitutional compulsory flag salutes in public schools).
95. Richard Lowe, Are We Flagging? BRISTOL EVENING POST, Apr. 19, 2003, at 3 (quoting
Franklin L. Kane, Secretary of the Interior, on Flag Day, 1914).
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its occupants raised a Union flag in its place before nightfall. Having
no Union flag on hand to raise, the landlord and tenants hurriedly
began to sew one, using whatever cloth they could find. Their efforts
paid off. Just as night was falling, they draped a Union flag from the
window. The mob, satisfied, moved on, and the boarding house was
spared.
96
What was striking about this story was its similarity to the Biblical
story of Passover. The Union flag, in the story, becomes the func-
tional equivalent of lamb's blood smeared on a door, a sign of alle-
giance, something that permits safe passage, and at the same time
signifies to whatever pestilence, plague, or mob that happens to be
about to move on, to pass over.
9 7
Examples of the American flag having this almost talismanic ef-
fect are legion. Not surprisingly, however, these examples begin with
the Civil War. Although not commonly known, the public's adoption
of the flag as iconic did not begin on June 14, 1777, when the Conti-
nental Congress approved the stars-and-stripes design for the Ameri-
can flag,98 but eighty-five years later, when the Civil War began.9 9
96. History Detectives (PBS television broadcast, Aug. 2003); see also Historic Flag, STATEN
ISLAND REG., Aug. 26 - Sept. 1, 2003, available at http://www.siregister.com/news story.php?nid=
221&edition=55 (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
97. See generally Exodus 12:1-51 (describing how the Israelites smeared lamb's blood on
their doors as a sign to the Lord to pass over their houses when He smote the first born of the
Egyptians).
98. The resolution passed by Congress read simply: "RESOLVED: That the Flag of the
United States be thirteen stripes, alternate red and white: that the Union be thirteen stars, white
in a blue field, representing a new constellation" J. Cotr. CONG. VIII, 464; ROBERT PHILLIPS,
TIE AMERICAN FLAG: ITS USES AND ABUSES 35 (1930) [hereinafter PHILLIPS, USES AND
ABuSES]. From the legislative record, it does not appear that Congress made any provision for
the making of new flags for its militia, or notified the militia of its action. FREDERICK C. HICKS,
THE FLAG OF THE UNITED STATES.100-03 (2d. ed. 1926). [hereinafter HICKS, FLAG OF THE U.S.];
see generally PHILLIPS, USES AND ABUSES, supra, at 40-42.
The year prior to its adoption of the "Stars and Stripes" design, Congress passed a resolu-
tion adopting as the official flag what is commonly known as the Grand Union flag. Although
the Grand Union flag also bore thirteen stripes, the canton displayed the Union Jack-from the
flag of England-rather than a constellation of stars. Indeed, that meaning is not immanent in a
flag is evidenced by the reaction of British and Loyalist soldiers upon first seeing the Grand
Union flag in Charlestowne, Massachusetts in 1776. Seeing that the flag incorporated the Union
Jack, the British and Loyalist soldiers interpreted the flag as a sign of surrender. WILLIS
FLETCHER JOHNSON, THE NATIONAL FLAG: A HISTORY 19-27 (1930) [hereinafter JOHNSON, THE
NATIONAL FLAG]. As George Washington wrote to his friend Colonel Joseph Reed:
"[Flarcical enough, we gave great Joy to them (the Red Coats I mean) without knowing
or intending it, for on that day.., we had hoisted the Union flag in compliment to the
United Colonies, but behold! It was received in Boston as a token of the deep Impres-
sion [the King's warning] had made upon us, and as a signal of Submission-so we
learn by a person out of Boston last night-by this time I presume they begin to think it
strange that we have not made a formal surrender of our Lines."




Indeed, between 1777 and the outbreak of the Civil War, the flag was
displayed almost exclusively on federal government buildings, naval
ships, and forts, and as flag historian Robert Philipps has noted, re-
garded as "peculiarly governmental property."100  The flag was
neither unfurled over schools, nor displayed outside homes. As one of
the directors of the Betsy Ross house in Philadelphia stated, "it would
have been unthinkable to fly an American flag at a private home. It
simply was not done."' ' Similarly, cultural historian Wilbur Zelinsky
has noted: "During its early career, the national flag was remarkably
unimportant to the citizenry at large."' 2
The change in attitude about the American flag, rather, and its
metamorphosis into a totemic symbol, was the result of the outbreak
of the Civil War; specifically, by Confederate troops firing on the
American flag-bedecked Fort Sumter, in South Carolina. 10 3 As Rob-
ert Justin Goldstein noted, "'all at once the people of the Northern
States and the Union discovered that there was an American Flag and
towns and villages, cities and county hamlets blossomed full-bloom
with a most gorgeous display of the Red, White and Blue." 1 4 As
another flag historian noted:
99. GOLDSTEIN, FLAG DESECRATION, supra note 93, at 3-4. This is not to suggest that the
American flag did not enjoy brief periods of popularity prior to the Civil War. For example,
following England's unsuccessful attack on Baltimore, Maryland on September 13, 1814, Francis
Scott Key wrote the Star-Spangled Banner, which in turn sparked public interest and pride in the
flag. After the close of the war, however, the song lost its popularity, as did the flag. Both the
song and the flag regained their popularity following the outbreak of the Civil War. JOHNSON,
THE NATIONAL FLAG, supra note 98, at 75-77.
100. PHILLIPS, USES AND ABUSES, supra note 98, at 58.
101. GOLDSTEIN, FLAG DESECRATION, supra note 93, at 4. Just as America's idolatry of the
flag can be traced to the Civil War, so can the story of the flag's creation by Betsy Ross. The
idea of Ross as "the mother of our country" began with her grandson William J. Canby who, in
an address before the Pennsylvania Historical Society in 1870, claimed that that when he was a
child, his grandmother informed him that she had created the first flag after being visited by
George Washington. Scholars have since questioned this claim, given the absence of any men-
tion of her in connection with the flag in Congressional records, Washington's diary, or any other
Revolutionary documents. For a discussion generally of this creation myth, see HiCKs, FLAG Or
THE U.S., supra note 98, at 16-17; JOHNSON, THE NATIONAL FLAG, supra note 98, at 38-42.
102. GOLDSTEIN, FLAG DESECRATION, supra note 93, at 4. Along these lines, it is interesting
to contrast the painter Gilbert Stuart's pre-Civil War portraits George Washington (1795-96),
John Adams (1800-15), James Madison (1805), James Monroe (1818), Thomas Jefferson (1805-
07), Paul Revere (1813) and Chief Justice John Jay (1794), in which flags are absent, with Eman-
uel Leutze's famous painting Washington Crossing the Delaware (1851) depicting Washington
leading the attack on Hessians at Trenton on December 25, 1776. In Leutze's painting, an anach-
ronistic American flag figures prominently.
103. LLOYD BALDERSTON, THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN FLAG, FROM MATERIALS
COLLECTED BY THE LATE GEORGE CANBY 93-95 (1909).
104. GOLDSTEIN, FLAG DESECRATION, supra note 93, at 5 (quoting an 1896 Connecticut
Sons of the American Revolution report).
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The fall of Sumter created great enthusiasm throughout the loyal
states, for the flag had come to have a new and strange signifi-
cance . . . One cry was raised, drowning all other voices-"War!
war to restore the Union! war to avenge the flag! . . ."
When the stars and stripes went down at Sumter, they went up
in every town and county in the loyal states. Every city, town and
village suddenly blossomed with banners. On forts and ships, from
church-spires and flag-staffs, from colleges, hotels, store-fronts, and
private balconies, from public edifices, everywhere the old flag was
flung out ....
The demand for flags was so great that the manufacturers could
not furnish them fast enough. Bunting was exhausted and recourse
was had to all sorts of substitutes. In New York, the demand for
flags raised the price of bunting from [$4.75] a piece to [$28.00].1 °5
The flag, following the outbreak of war, thus became a symbol
around which loyalists rallied.
At a flag raising ceremony that attracted 100,000 people at Union
Square in New York City on April 20, 1861, the tattered remnants of
the Fort Sumter flag were placed in the hands of a statute of George
Washington; throughout the war, this relic was used as a fund-raising
device, and upon the recapture of Sumter in 1865, the flag was re-
tuned and rededicated in an elaborate ceremony.
10 6
It was during this period that the removal of one flag, namely the
Confederate flag, and the raising of another flag, the Union flag, re-
sulted in the boarding house on Staten Island being spared.10 7 . The
protection that could be secured by displaying the American flag con-
tinued through World Wars I and II. For example, in 1918, a New
105. 2 GEORGE HENRY PREBLE, ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FLAG 453 (1917).
106. GOLDSTEIN, FLAG DESECRATION, supra note 93, at 6.
107. Far from being an isolated incident, vigilantes in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Trenton,
New Jersey and other cities also demanded, under threat of violence, that various businesses and
newspapers display the Union flag. Id. at 7.
Of course, there are other nineteenth-century examples of flags providing protection. Dur-
ing the height of a contested presidential election in Mexico, for example, a mob converged on
the U.S. embassy in search of Spaniards seeking sanctuary there, and shots were fired. The U.S.
Minister to Mexico, Joel R. Poinsett, then ordered that an American flag be unfurled from the
balcony. According to legend, as Poinsett stood below the flag and proclaimed its protection for
all in his household, the shouting ceased, guns were lowered, and the mob retreated. 1 GEORGE
HENRY PREBLE, HISTORY OF THE FLAG OF THE UNITED STATES 351-52 (1880). There is also a
children's story from the nineteenth century in which:
[T]he flag mysteriously saves a boy named Joe trapped in a burning house on the
Fourth of July-the flagpole bends over to him when he finds himself cut off on the
second story; he takes hold of the banner, pulls himself out of the blazes, and shimmies
down to safety.
SCOT M. GUENTER, THE AMERICAN FLAG 1777-1924 111 (1990); see also J. William Fosdick, The
Studlefunk's Bonfire, in ST. NICHOLAS 23 (1986).
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York woman was arrested for removing an American flag that a
neighbor had placed in her window and replacing it with a German
flag while declaring, "To hell with the American flag. I want my own
flag." ' Similarly, in 1930, a mob of 700 local residents and Ku Klux
Klan ("KKK") members confronted two women who ran a Commu-
nist children's camp in Van Etten, New York, and demanded that they
hoist an American flag. When the women refused, the mob seized
them and brought them before a judge, and flag desecration charges
were filed. Following trial, the judge sentenced the two women to
ninety days in prison each, declaring that their sentences were in-
tended "as a warning to Communists all over the United States that
they could not trifle with the American flag or teach un-Christian
doctrines."' 0 9
That having the correct flag was essential to protection is perhaps
best demonstrated when one considers the trade unions and striking
workers that sought recourse in the American flag during the early
part of the twentieth century. Strikers during this period routinely
carried or marched behind American flags to show their bona fides as
patriotic Americans and to ward off physical attacks by those who
perceived striking as un-American."' During this same period, being
without a flag often led to ostracism and violence. Hundreds of Jeho-
vah's Witnesses were expelled from school for refusing to salute the
flag because their refusal, on religious grounds, was viewed as evi-
dence of insufficient patriotism,1"' expulsions which the Supreme
Court initially deemed constitutional, on "national security" grounds,
108. GOLDSTEIN, FLAG DESECRATION, supra note 93, at 81.
109. Id. at 90.
110. Although strikers during this period routinely carried or marched behind flags to show
their bona fides as patriotic Americans and ward off physical attacks by those who perceived
them as un-American, the flag did not insulate them completely in this regard.
[Diuring a bitterly fought coal strike in Colorado in 1914, strikers carried a flag when
they greeted the well-known labor agitator "Mother" Jones at a railroad station in Jan-
uary. After she was arbitrarily jailed strikers marched behind a flag to demand her
freedom, only to be attacked by mounted troops with guns and sabers drawn, an event
that led to headlines in the labor press such as. "Woman carrying American flag
knocked down with butt of gun and flag torn from her hands by militiamen." During a
textile strike in Passaic, New Jersey, which erupted amidst the Red Scare of 1919, strik-
ers held a mammoth parade on March 17, led by army veterans holding American flags.
And according to a standard history of the labor movement in Colorado, striking min-
ers who were shot at by state police in 1927, with the result that five men were killed
and another critically wounded, had marched "with the front rank carrying American
flags, as was customary."
GOLDSTEIN, FLAG DESECRATION, supra note 93, at 88.
111. Id. at 93-94; see also DAVID R. MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR: THE FLAG SA-
LUTE CONTROVERSY (1962) 56, 70-78; LEONARD A. STEVENS, SALUTE! THE CASE OF THE BIBLE
VS. THE FLAG 9-10 (1973),
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in Minersville School District v. Gobitis.112 It is far from an exaggera-
tion to note that the Supreme Court's decision sanctioned the contin-
ued expulsion of students, and implicitly fostered the harassment and
mob attacks of Jehovah's Witnesses,1 13 which continued unabated un-
til 1943, when the Supreme Court reversed itself and struck down
compulsory flag salute laws in West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette."4 That the flag signified protection is also evident in popu-
lar culture during this period. In December 1940, Marvel Comics cre-
ated Captain America.'1 5 A year later, a month before the bombing
of Pearl Harbor, DC Comics created Wonder Woman.1" 6 Both
superheroes, it can be argued, are anthropomorphisms of the Ameri-
can flag.117 Their costumes are reconstructed flags. Their charge: To
protect America from its enemies.
The flag as a protector continued during the Vietnam era, when
citizens used flags to align themselves with the Government and po-
lice, and separate themselves from anti-war activists." 8 During this
112. 310 U.S. 586, 595-96 (1940).
113. For example, in 1940, police officials in Richwood, West Virginia "forced a group of
[Jehovah's] Witnesses to swallow large doses of castor oil [and] paraded them roped together
before a large crowd ... [which] attempted unsuccessfully to force them to plead allegiance to
the flag." GOLDSTEIN, FLAG DESECRATION, supra note 93, at 94.
114. 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943).
115. Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 2002).
116. Hank Stuever, Keeping Wonder Woman in Shape, L.A. TIMES, May 23, 2001, at E4.
117. By contrast, the artist Rene Cox, in her Raje series (1998), photographs herself as a
Black superhero battling urban blight and villains. Cox also costumes herself in the colors of a
flag, but chooses the red, yellow and green colors of the Black solidarity flag. In a similar vein, a
South Carolina rap group has incorporated into its act what it calls the "New South" flag-the
Confederate flag redone in Black solidarity colors. See Mike Smith, Banner Combines Confeder-
ate Flag, Colors of Black Liberation, ATLANTA J. CoNST., Apr. 22, 1994, at A4.
118. By contrast, many in the Civil Rights movement read the flag as reinforcing the racial
hegemony I argue the Confederate flag now communicates. The American flag, during this
period, symbolized to many African Americans a lapse in protection. Thus, during a civil rights
demonstration in Cordele, Georgia, in March 1966, protesters ripped down an American flag
from the Cordele courthouse, prompting Governor Carl Sanders to order state police to protect
the flag and prompting the KKK to hold a counter demonstration during which the Grand
Dragon admonished White Georgians, "If you can't protect this flag we will bring enough
Klansmen to do it for you." GOLDSTEIN, FLAG DESECRATION, supra note 93, at 157.
The following year Sidney Street, a forty-seven-year-old African American bus driver who
had been awarded a Bronze Star for his heroism during World War II, committed an equally
political act. While listening to the radio in his Brooklyn apartment, Street heard a report that
James Meredith, a civil rights leader, had been shot by a sniper in Mississippi. Saying to himself,
"They didn't protect him," Street "took from his drawer a neatly folded, [forty-eight]-star Amer-
ican flag which he formerly had displayed on national holidays," took it to a street corner, and
publicly burned it, exclaiming that if "they let that happen to Meredith, we don't need an Ameri-
can flag." Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 578 (1969). The Supreme Court overturned his
conviction for violating New York's flag desecration law (which also outlawed contemptuous
remarks about the flag) upon the ground that the trial record did not preclude the possibility
that his conviction was based solely on his remarks, rather than the flag burning. Id. at 594.
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period, hundreds of thousands of Americans pasted flag decals on
their windows, and flag stickers on their car bumpers; for example, in
1969 and 1970, over 70 million flag decals were distributed, including
as part of commercial promotions through magazines, gas stations,
banks, and civil organizations." 9 The necessity of displaying the flag
was even noted by a cartoon in the October 24, 1970 issue of the New
Yorker. The cartoon depicted an executive telling an employee,
"'Naturally, X, the company doesn't care whether its employees have
little flags on their desks or not. It's purely a voluntary thing. We just
wondered why you happened to be the only person who hasn't got
one.'" 2 0 The idea of the flag as protector has only continued since
then. We have seen it most obviously, since September 11, 2001 in
Arab-Americans literally cloaking themselves in the American flag 12
1
to ward against everything from job discrimination,' 22 to racial profil-
ing, 12 3 to harassment,1 2 4 to violence. 1
25
119. GOLDSTEIN, FLAG DESECRATION, supra note 93, at 157.
120. Id. (quoting a cartoon from NEw YORKER, Oct. 24, 1970, at 56).
121. See, e.g., Francis X. Donnelly, Metro Arabs, Muslims Suffer Harassment, Hatred, DE-
TROIT NEWS, Nov. 4, 2003, at 1 (Arabs and Muslims have "wrap[ped] themselves in the Ameri-
can flag, hoping that its presence in their homes and workplaces send the message that they are
not terrorists"); Beth J. Harpaz, Times Are Tense for Arab Americans Even in New York a City
ofImmigrants, Sees Incidents of Backlash, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Sept. 23, 2001, at 3A (profil-
ing a Muslim woman who "wears an American flag pin-partly to show solidarity, but partly as a
defensive measure"); David A. Markiewicz, The Year That Changed America: Dearborn, Michi-
gan, Arab Enclave Wrestles with Identity, ATLANTA J., Dec. 30, 2001, at A18 (in "Arab-American
neighborhoods, American flags and patriotic messages adorn shop windows, front lawns and
automobiles" in a public assurance of patriotism); Thane Peterson, The Gift of Diversity, the
Need for Tolerance, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Sept. 18, 2001 ("Arab-American store owners are
threatened with vandalism if they don't display American flags"), at http://www.businessweek.
com; Emily Sweeney. Backlash Felt Far from Ground Zero, Anti-Muslim Bias Focus of Discus-
sion, BOSTON GLOBE, June 16,2002, at 4 (Muslim responded to harassment by taping "American
flags up in the windows of his store.").
122. See generally AM.-ARAB ANI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., REPORT ON HATE CRIMES
AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINsT ARAB AMERICANS: THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 BACKLASH 7 (re-
porting over 800 cases of employment discrimination against Arab-Americans following Septem-
ber 11, 2001, a four-fold increase over previous annual rates), available at www.adc.org (last
visited Oct. 6, 2004).
123. Id. (reporting over eighty cases of discriminatory removal of Arab-American and Mus-
lim passengers from aircrafts after boarding, but before takeoff, following September 11, 2001);
see also Donnelly, supra note 121 ("Arab-Americans have a name for the offense they seem to
be punished for: Flying While Brown.").
124. Foreward to FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HATE CRIME STATISTICS 2001, available
at http://www.fbi.gov/ucrlhate.pdf, reports 481 Islamic bias incidents in 2001, an increase of
more than 1600% over the previous year, during which 28 such incidents occurred, FED. Bu-
REAU OF INVESTIGATION & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2000. HATE
CRIME 60 (2000), available at http:/www.fbi.gov/ucr/ciusOO/contents.pdf (last visited Sept. 26,
2004); see also Donnelly, supra note 121 (Complaints received by Council on American-Islamic
Relations tripled after September 11, 2001, and survey of 945 Muslims found that 48% believed
the quality of their lives had declined since September 11, 2001.).
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In addition to signifying protection, the flag also marks territory,
asserts power and control, extends and delineates borders. Think of
Robert Peary planting the American flag at the North Pole, 126 or Neil
Armstrong planting a waving flag 27 on the moon. Think of the Joe
Rosenthahl photograph of soldiers raising the flag on Mt. Suribachi
during the battle for Iwo Jima in February 1945, marking the first Jap-
anese soil captured by the Americans, which photograph was recently
replicated after the fall of the World Trade Center towers, quite liter-
ally to reclaim control and power over the site. For a more recent
example, think of the debacle that resulted in April 2003, when Amer-
ican soldiers in Baghdad, before toppling a statue of Saddam Hussein,
first draped his head in the American flag. The American flag was
quickly removed, and replaced with an Iraqi flag, but sparked world-
wide controversy and condemnation nonetheless, and prompted the
Army to subsequently issue a statement barring any display of the
American flag on vehicles, buildings, statues, or command posts.1 28
The controversy was the result of the flag being such a universal sym-
bol of occupation, imperialism, 129 colonization ' 30 and control.1 3 1
125. Executive Summary to Am-ARAB ANTI -DISCRIMINATION COMM, supra note 122, availa-
ble at http://server.traffic.northwestern.edu/events/rps/shora.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2004) (sec-
tion entitled Physical and Psychological Attacks) (reporting over 700 violent incidents targeting
Arab Americans, or those perceived to be Arab Americans, Arabs and Muslims in the first nine
weeks following the attacks, and approximately 165 violent incidents from January 1, 2002 to
October 11, 2002).
126. Although Peary is generally credited with being the first explorer to reach the North
Pole, recent scholarship suggests that in fact his companion, Matthew Henson, an African Amer-
ican, reached the North Pole forty-five minutes ahead of Peary. When Peary finally caught up
with Henson, Henson greeted him by saying, "I think I'm the first man to sit on top of the
world." Henson recalled that this angered Peary, who responded by "fasten[ing] a flag to a staff
and plant[ing] it firmly on top of his igloo. Anna Brendle, Profile: African-American North Pole
Explorer Matthew Henson; NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, Jan. 15, 2003, available at http://news.
nationalgeographic.com/news/2003/01/0110_030113_henson.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2004).
127. In fact, the planting of a "waving" flag on the moon was a constructed illusion. Because
the atmosphere on the moon is airless, a specially designed brace was created to give the impres-
sion that the flag was blowing in the wind. HARRY HURT III, FOR ALL MANKIND 180-81 (1988).
128. Bernard Weinraub, After Euphoria, U.S. Flag Goes into Hiding in Iraq, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Apr. 11, 2003, at 5.
129. The language flag historian Willis Johnson uses in describing the flag at new frontiers is
telling. For example, Johnson describes Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry's carrying the
flag into the harbor of Yeddo, Japan as symbolically opening "that hermit empire to rational
intercourse with the civilized world." JOHNSON, THE NATIONAL FLAG, supra note 98, at 88.
Johnson also becomes effusive in describing Henry Morton Stanley's carrying of the flag into the
"torrid jungles of Equatorial Africa ... the heart of the dark continent" to "rescue" the explorer
David Livingston:
There have been few more interesting scenes than that of the meeting of two [Wlhite
men, amid a multitude of Black natives in the African wilderness, when Stanley, carry-
ing the Stars and Stripes in one hand and raising his hat with the other inquired: "Doc-
tor Livingston, I presume?" Three years later, Stanley went to Africa again, and made
his way from the East Coast to the Great Lakes, thence to the upper reaches of the
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Perhaps, the only flag that suggests the absence of control is the white
flag of surrender, the flag wiped clean, its colors erased.
The flag can also be read as signifying a utopian idea of the status
quo. As the art history scholar John Yau notes in an essay on Jasper
Johns' seminal Flag painting:
[A] flag is a symbol that helps citizens believe they stand outside
time and change. It sums up a moment of resolution in a collective
history, as if that moment is neither mythically narrative nor subject
to disruption or revision. Like most flags the American flag repre-
sents both a belief in unity of purpose and the existence of a com-
mon social reality. It is a palpable symbol which proposes that the
world will go on being the same, and that its existence within the
world as a meaningful object is guaranteed.132
In this sense, the American flag can be read as an assurance of
stability, as a promise to ensure an "American way of life." Stated
differently, in protecting, the flag also preserves-although what it
preserves may be an idealized version of what exists. Instead of cin-
ema verite, the American flag promises Leave It To Beaver 33 and
Congo, and so down that mighty river to its mouth. Thus, the Stars and Stripes was the
first flag ever to be borne down from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic; the first to
follow the thitherto unknown course of the Congo, and the pioneer in opening the way
for the Congo Free State.
Id. at 89.
130. That America was colonized with a flag, at least in our collective mythology, perhaps
goes without saying. As described by Christopher Columbus's son:
Columbus dressed in scarlet first stepped on shore from the little boat which bore him
from his vessels, bearing the royal standard of Spain emblazoned with the arms of Cas-
tile and Leon in his own hand, followed by the Pinzons in their own boats each bearing
a banner of the expedition, viz: a white flag with a green cross, having on each side the
letters F and Y surmounted by golden crowns.
GEORGE HENRY PREBLE, OUR FLAG. ORIGINS AND PROGRESS OF THE FLAG OF THE UNITED
STATES 110-11 (1872)
131. One could argue that it was the fear of control, or at least symbolic control, that
prompted laws forbidding the display of red flags during the Red Scare of the early twentieth
century. See generally Elmer M. Million, Red Flags and the Flag, ROCKY MOUNTAIN L. REV.
1940-1941, at 13, 47-60. The Supreme Court was called upon to address the constitutionality of
these laws in Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), which involved the conviction of
nineteen-year old summer camp counselor who, in addition to teaching the children history and
economics, taught "class consciousness" and "the solidarity of the workers," and routinely led
the students in a pledge of allegiance 'to the worker's red flag, and to the cause for which it
stands; one aim throughout our lives, freedom for the working class." Id. at 362. Concluding
that the law was unconstitutional under the First Amendment, the Court reversed Stromberg's
conviction. Id. at 369-70.
132. JOHN YAU, THE UNITED STATES OF JASPER JOHNS 8 (1996).
133. Leave It To Beaver (CBS television broadcast 1957-1959, NBC television broadcast
1959-1963); see also Peter Orlick, Leave it to Beaver, at http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/L/
htmlL/leaveittob/leaveittob.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2004).
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Happy Days.13 4 Instead of Edward Hopper, the flag promises Nor-
man Rockwell.13
It is this idea of the flag exemplifying protection, and power, and
stasis that perhaps explains the visceral reaction many Americans
have not just to the burning or mutilation of the flag, but to the disre-
gard of the flag. Examples include the rash of flag burnings during the
Vietnam era, including a highly public and publicized flag burning in
Central Park in April 1967, which prompted Congress to pass the first
federal flag desecration law in 1968; the outrage that erupted follow-
ing an art exhibit by "Dred" Scott Tyler, which included a flag on the
floor and an invitation to patrons to step on it;136 and Republican
Presidential candidate George H.W. Bush's use of the flag during the
1988 campaign to portray himself as patriotic, and to impugn the pa-
triotism of his democratic rival Michael Dukakis. During his cam-
paign, Bush led his audiences in recitals of the pledge, surrounded his
campaign stops with flags, and conducted campaign stops in Flag City,
U.S.A. and at a flag factory. 137 At the same time, citing Dukakis's
veto as Governor of Massachusetts against a law requiring daily reci-
tation of the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag, and ignoring the Su-
preme Court's decision in Barnette, Bush portrayed Dukakis as
unpatriotic. 138 Bush invoked the flag so often that Time magazine
noted:
Five weeks after the Republican convention, the public can be cer-
tain of [only] two things about George Bush: he loves the flag, and
he believes in pledging allegiance to it every morning. But some
voters may wonder what he would do with the rest of his day if he
became president 3 9
A firestorm of protest also erupted after the Supreme Court re-
versed the conviction of Gregory Lee Johnson in Texas v. Johnson.1
40
Johnson was convicted for violating Texas's flag desecration law by
burning a flag outside the 1984 Republican National Convention as
134. Happy Days (ABC television Broadcast 1974-1984); see also Happy Days, at http://
www.geocities.comi-.maxraby/tv/happy (last visited Sept. 27, 2004).
135. Indeed, it is this sanitized version of America that another artist, Faith Ringgold, criti-
ques in her quilted version of the American flag, Flag for the Moon: Die Nigger 1967-69, in which
the word "DIE" can be seen dimly against the stars, and the silver stripes spell out the word
"nigger."
136. GOLDSTEIN, FLAG DESECRATION, supra note 93, at 201-02.
137. Whitney Smith, The American Flag in the 1988 Presidential Campaign, FLAG BULL. 128
(1988).
138. Id.
139. GOLDSTEIN, FLAG DESECRATION, supra note 93, at 201.
140. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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part of a larger protest by hundreds of demonstrators. On appeal, the
Supreme Court overturned his conviction, finding Texas's flag dese-
cration law, and by implication flag desecration laws in general, un-
constitutional under the First Amendment. The protest that followed
the Supreme Court's decision was immediate. Within a week of the
decision, President Bush proposed a constitutional amendment to
overturn the decision, and thirty-nine separate resolutions were spon-
sored in the House and Senate calling for such an amendment. 41
Polls showed that seventy-one percent of Americans favored a consti-
tutional amendment, and within months of the decision, 1.5 million
Americans had signed a petition in support of an amendment. 142 In
the end, Congress responded by passing the Flag Protection Act of
1989 (FPA),143 rather than seeking a constitutional amendment."' In-
stead of putting an end to the flag debate, however, the FPA spurred
the largest wave of flag burning incidents in American history, and a
flurry of arrests.' 45 On March 13, 1990, U.S. Solicitor General Ken-
neth Starr invoked the mandatory and expedited review provision of
the FPA to seek Supreme Court review, which the Supreme Court
accepted in cases consolidated and known as United States v. Eich-
man."' Notwithstanding the FPA's allegedly neutral content, the Su-
141. The response to the Supreme Court's decision in Texas v. Johnson was, for the most
part, not only emotional, but highly vitriolic, as Goldstein has noted.
Representative Ron Marlenee of Montana termed the decision "treasonous" and, re-
ferring to the six marines depicted in the Iwo Jima Memorial, declared, "These six
brave soldiers were symbolically shot in the back by five men in [Bllack robes." The
Chairman of the South Carolina Joint Veterans Council called on Americans to write to
their elected officials to demand that "this crap" be stopped, while conservative colum-
nist Patrick Buchanan termed the decision an "atrocity" and the Court a "renegade
tribunal" to which the American people should respond by putting "a fist in their face."
The New York Daily News termed the Johnson decision "dumb" and declared it put the
Court in "naked contempt" of the American people and displayed "pompous insensi-
tivity to the most beloved symbol of the most benevolent form of government ever to
appear on this Earth"; it also published a cartoon showing a figure resembling Presi-
dent Bush pouring gas on a pile of law books forming a pyre below five bound judges
who were bearing copies of the "flag case," with the caption, "Anybody got a match."
GOLDSTEIN, FLAG DESECRATION, supra note 93, at 206. Determined not to be outflagged, Dem-
ocrats joined in the "fusillade of pro-flag rhetoric," matching the Republicans "word for word."
Robin Toner, Democrats, in a Flurry of Bills, Seek to Recapture the Flag Issue from the Foe, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 1989, at B6; see also GOLDSTEIN, FLAG DESECRATION, supra note 93, at 208.
142. Legislators Support Flag Move, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1989, at 6.
143. The Flag Protection Act was viewed as neutral since it provided penalties of up to one
year for anyone who "knowingly mutilates, physically defiles, burns, maintains on the floor or
ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United States," without regard to the actor's intent.
Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 700).
144. GOLDSTEIN, FLAG DESECRATION, supra note 93, at 208.
145. Id. at 208.
146. 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
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preme Court struck down the FPA as a clear violation of the First
Amendment.
147
That flags signify protection, power, and stasis is at the heart of
other recent controversies over displays of the flag. The controversy
surrounding the display of the rainbow flag of lesbian and gay pride is
one example. In Columbus, Ohio, a battle between long-term re-
sidents, mostly Black and working class, and newer residents, mostly
White and gay and attempting to gentrify the neighborhood, was ex-
emplified by flag wars. Young gay men and women, after moving to
the neighborhood, began to hang rainbow flags. Many Black re-
sidents, in response, began to hang Black solidarity flags.
This battle for control and power was thus replicated in a battle
of flags, a battle documented in the film "Flag Wars," recently shown
on the PBS Network. 48 More recently, when Orlando, Florida hung
rainbow flags, just temporarily, to celebrate Gay Pride Month, Pat
Robinson claimed that Orlando was bringing about "the destruction
of your nation. It'll bring about terrorist bombs; it'll bring earth-
quakes, tornadoes and possibly a meteor." 1 49 In response to the con-
troversy, Orlando officials banned the future display of any flags.
150
More recently, the KKK elected to stage a rally at the City Hall
in Cleveland, Ohio because the city had flown a rainbow flag there,
again temporarily, for the Gay Pride Month in June. Apparently hop-
ing to kill two birds with the same stone, the KKK also elected to
stage the rally on a Saturday, to protest Rosh Hashana. Prior to the
rally, the KKK publicly announced that it planned to burn both the
rainbow flag and an Israeli flag.1
5 1
As another example, think back to the protests that erupted a few
years ago when, on the penultimate episode of Seinfeld, Kramer acci-
dentally set a Puerto Rican flag on fire, and then attempted to put out
147. Id at 319. Championing flag desecration laws remains a way to appeal to segments of
the population. General Wesley K. Clark, in campaigning for the Democratic nomination for
president this past year, told a crowd on Veteran's Day that he supported a constitutional
amendment that would make it illegal to desecrate the American flag, drawing applause from
the crowd. Edward Wyatt, Clark Tells Veterans He Backs Amendment on Flag Desecration, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2003, at A18.
148. POV: Flag Wars (PBS television broadcast, June 17, 2003).
149. Thomas B. Edsall, Forecasting Havoc for Orlando; on TV, Robertson Says Display of
Gays' Flags Invites Disaster, WASH. POST, June 10, 1998, at All.
150. Sherri M. Owens, New Flag Question Is About Flying Old Glory, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
June 24, 1998, at Dl.
151. Mathew Marx, Police Prepare for KKK Rally, Counter Rally on Busy Sunday, COLUM-
Bus DISPATCH, Sept. 10, 1999, at 3B.
[VOL. 48:121
Flags
the fire by stomping on the flag.1 - 2 Even more recently, a school dis-
trict's flying of the purple-and-white flag of the Iroquois Confederacy,
in recognition of the members of the five tribes who comprised
twenty-three percent of the student body, was met with protests and
petitions from other students and parents, who viewed the flying of
the Iroquois flag as a ceding of control.153 Of course there is the con-
troversy surrounding state displays of the Confederate flag.154
The typical debate about state displays of the Confederate flag
turns on two readings of the flag. On the one side, there are those
who see the flag as an emblem of Southern pride, as recognition of the
many young men who fought and died as Confederates during the
Civil War, as a recognition of tradition.155 On the other side, there are
those who see the flag as a reminder of slavery, or as a wistful re-
minder of the good old days when cotton was king.' 5 6 Framed in this
manner, one is either a "survivor" or a "victimizer." '57
152. The episode sparked a fury of protests, including condemnation from Governor Pedro
Rossello of Puerto Rico, and resulted in NBC issuing a formal apology and withdrawing the
episode from future syndication. Herb Boyd, 'Seinfeld' Inflames Group of Puerto Rican Protes-
ters, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, May 27, 1998, at 10; Lloyd Grove & Blaine Harden, 'Seinfeld'
Parade Steps on Some Toes, WASH. POST, May 9, 1998, at D1. Miguel Perez, Seinfeld's Ethnic
Insult, RECORD (Northern, N.J.), May 13, 1998, at A3; Puerto Rico Blasts Seinfeld, TORONTO
STAR, May 12, 1998, at E6.
153. Michelle York, School's New Iroquois Flag Stirs Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2003, at
B10.
154. For example, former Vermont Governor Howard Dean, in campaigning for the Demo-
cratic nomination of president, was recently excoriated by rivals for suggesting that the Demo-
crats regain disaffected Southern voters by speaking to "guys with Confederate flags in their
pickup trucks." See, e.g., Jodi Wilgoren, In a 'Jam,' Dean Apologizes for Remarks on Rebel Flag,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 2003, at A26. As Dean later conceded, his statement set off a "huge contre-
temps," notwithstanding the context. Ultimately, Dean was forced to issue an apology. Richard
L. Berke, What You Say Can't Hurt You Until It Can, N.Y. TIMES. Nov. 9, 2003, at Wk.3.
155. A former, Mississippi-born editor of Harpers magazine put it this way:
In modern-day America, there is too much fashionable tampering with authentic tradi-
tion. At the peril which such contentions evoke, I argue that this juggling with expres-
sions of the past is reminiscent of the way the communists are eternally rewriting
history, obliterating symbols with each new guard. Finally, one could make a strong
case that Dixie and the flag and the names "Ole Miss" and "Rebels," deriving from old
suffering and apartness and the urge to remember, are expressions of a mutual commu-
nal heritage, [W]hite and [B]lack, springing from the very land itself and its awesome
strengths and shortcomings. As a historian friend of mine once remarked, "There's
nothing wrong with the Confederate flag. The Civil War was fought over more than
slavery."
WILLIE MORRIS, TERRAINS OF THE HEART AND OTHER ESSAYS ON HOME 258 (1981) (emphasis
in original).
156. See, e.g., Forman, Jr., supra note 34. at 513 (arguing that the Confederate flag "glorifies
and memorializes [the] brutal regime [of chattel slavery]").




A more contextualized approach, however, reveals the State dis-
play of the flag as a sign of protection, of control, of allegiance, of
stasis."'5 Put differently, the Confederate flag, when displayed by the
Government, declares the state as belonging, primarily, to a particular
group,'- and declares recognition of a duty to protect that group.
160
Its message need never be articulated, but its meaning is evident.
Indeed, if one has any doubt of the message the state display of
the Confederate flag sends, one need only imagine the message that
would be communicated by a state or local authority displaying, in
addition to the American flag, a flag depicting a Swastika.16' Al-
though a swastika is an extreme example, the display of less incendi-
ary flags also makes the point. Were Staten Island, New York to raise,
in addition to the American flag, an Italian flag, for example, it would
send not only a message of Italian pride, but also the message that
Staten Island is Italian, belongs to the Italians, and is for Italians. It
would thus suggest a hierarchical positioning of Italians at the top of
its various constituents. Similarly, were the Bronx to raise, say, a
158. For example, in his book on southern tradition, the historian Eugene D. Genovese la-
ments the "'modernization' that is transforming the South" and has resulted in what he per-
ceives to be the "neglect of, or contempt for, the history of southern [W]hites, without which
some of the more distinct and noble features of American national life must remain incompre-
hensible." EUGENE D. GENOVESE, THE SOUTHERN TRADITION: THE ACHIEVEMENT AND LIMI-
TATIONS OF AN AMERICAN CONSERVATISM X-Xi (1994). The Confederate flag functions as a
rearguard against such modernization. See also Forman, supra note 34, at 506 (noting that the
Confederate flag "also stands for a history of resistance to change in the twentieth century").
159. Akhil Reed Amar, Civil Religion and its Discontents, 67 TEXAS L. REV. 1153, 1166 n.76
(1989) (reviewing SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988)) has noted, Confederate
flags "all too easily exclude large numbers of citizens, most notably [Bilacks."
160. Indeed, one can read the state display of the Confederate flag as a silent ratification of
the principles articulated in the Confederate Constitution. For a discussion of the Confederate
Constitution and its explicit guarantee to maintain the underclass status of Blacks, see MAR-
SHALL L. DEROSA, THE CONFEDERATE CONSTITUTION OF 1861: AN INQUIRY INTO AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 1-5 (1991) (summarizing creation and extirpation of Confederate Constitu-
tion): WILLIAM L. MILLER, ARGUING ABOUT SLAVERY: THE GREAT BATTLE IN THE UNITED
STATES CONGRESS 21 (1996); Martin D. Carcieri, The South Carolina Secession Statement of
1860 and the One Florida Initiative: The Limits of a Historical Analogy and the Possibility of
Racial Reconciliation, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 577, 584 (2001); Ralph Michael Stein, The South
Won't Rise Again but It's Time to Study the Defunct Confederacy's Constitution, 21 PACE L. REV.
395 (2001); Tsesis, supra note 34, at 596-98. The Confederate Constitution, which was adopted
in 1861, is reprinted in EMORY M. THOMAS, THE CONFEDERATE NATION 1861-1865 307-22
(1979).
161. Indeed, the swastika is considered such an incendiary symbol that its display, and the
display of other Third Reich symbols, are banned under Germany's Constitution, with excep-
tions for artistic purposes. See GRUDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 5(2) (F.R.G.), translated in
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 106 (1994); see also Jonathan Kaufman, As
Neo-Nazis Riot, Germany Still Outlaws the Swastika, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 4. 1993, at 1: David
E. Weiss, Note, Striking a Difficult Balance: Combating the Threat of Neo-Nazism in Germany
While Preserving Individual Liberties, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 899, 928 (1994).
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Black Power flag, it would communicate both Black pride and Black
precedence. It is perhaps by imagining other flags being displayed by
the Government that one begins to appreciate how a State's display of
the Confederate flag reifies an antiquated racial order, renders Blacks,
and Jews, and gays, and other minorities second-class citizens.
This analysis, I hope, makes transparent the violence t62 inherent
in the Eleventh Circuit's decisions in Hunt and Coleman. Peggy Davis
uses the term "microagression "to refer to the 'subtle, stunning, auto-
matic, and non-verbal exchanges which are 'put downs' of Blacks by
offenders."'" 6 3 She, in turn, borrows the term from psychiatry, which
defines "microagressions" this way:
"Microagressions simultaneously sustain defensive deferential
thinking and erode[] self confidence in Blacks .... [B]y mono-
polizing ... perception and action through regularly irregular dis-
ruption, they contribute[ ] to relative paralysis of action, planning,
and self-esteem. They seem to be principle foundation for the ver-
ification of Black inferiority for both [Wihites and Blacks.' 1 6 4
Here, the Eleventh Circuit decisions, and the state display of the
Confederate flag, are more than microaggressions. Given its
messages, the state display of the Confederate flag is more like "spirit-
murder," the term coined by Patricia Williams to refer simultaneously
to acts of racism, and the rupture of self and invisible lacerations suf-
fered by victims of racism. As Patricia Williams has noted:
Society is only beginning to recognize that racism is as devastating,
as costly, and as psychically obliterating as robbery or assault; in-
deed they are often the same. Racism resembles other offenses
against humanity whose structures are so deeply embedded in cul-
ture as to prove extremely resistant to being recognized as forms of
oppression. It can be as difficult to prove as child abuse or rape,
where the victim is forced to convince others that he or she was not
at fault, or that the perpetrator was not just "playing around." As in
rape cases, victims of racism must prove that they did not distort the
circumstances, misunderstand the intent, or even enjoy it.1 65
162. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1609 (1986).
163. Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microagression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1565 (1989) (quoting Pierce,
Psychiatric Problems of the Black Minority, in AMERICA HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 512, 515
(1974)).
164. Id. at 1566-67 (quoting C. PIERCE, UNITY IN DIVERSITY: 33 YEARS OF STRESS 17) (un-
published manuscript 1986) (omissions and alterations in original).
165. Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as
the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 127, 129-30 (1987).
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This is what the state display of the Confederate flag is. Nothing
less.
IV. FLAGS: A FABLE
In The Chronicle of the Space Traders,166 Derrick Bell weaves a
metaphorical tale to explore the limits of the Equal Protection Clause
when the inequality of a few is pitted against what I refer to as the
superequality167 of the majority. The story he tells is at once familiar
and disturbing: The arrival of 1,000 space ships on the first day of a
new year; the welcoming delegation of government officials and mem-
bers of the media; the alien crew, cloaked in invisibility, sounding
"like the former President Ronald Reagan whose recorded voice, in
fact, they had dubbed into their computerized language translation
system;" and the visitors' proffer of various bounty: "gold to bail out
the almost bankrupt federal, state, and local governments; special
chemicals that would sanitize the almost uninhabitable environment;
and a totally safe nuclear engine with fuel to relieve the nation's
swiftly diminishing fuel resources. '  The rub is in what the space
travelers seek in return, and in the country's response:
The visitors wanted to take back to their home star all African
Americans [defined as all citizens whose birth certificates listed
them as [B]lack]. The proposition instantly reduced the welcoming
delegation to a bumbling disarray. The visitors seemed to expect
this reaction. After emphasizing that acceptance of their offer was
entirely voluntary and would not be coerced, they withdrew to their
ships. The Traders promised to give the nation a period of sixteen
days to respond. The decision would be due on January 17, the na-
tional holiday commemorating Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s
birthday.
1 69
The proposed trade, in Bell's narrative, proves to be a temptation
not easily resisted. Congress is called into special session; state legisla-
tures are convened; negotiations are begun:
166. Derrick Bell, After We're Gone: Prudent Speculations on America in a Post-Racial Ep-
och, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUrTING EDGE 3 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995). I first
heard this tale when Derrick Bell spoke at Columbia Law School while I was a student there.
That I remembered it almost word-for-word in subsequent years is a testament to its polemical
resonance.
167. By superequality, I am referring to the type of equality advanced by Orwell's Napoleon:
"All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others." GEORGE ORWELL,
ANIMAL FARM 112 (1946).
168. Bell, supra note 166, at 3.
169. Id. at 3-4.
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[U.S.] officials tried in secret negotiations to get the Space Traders
to exchange only those [B]lacks locked in the inner-cities, but the
visitors made it clear that this was an all or nothing offer. During
these talks, the Space Traders warned that they would withdraw
their proposition unless the United States halted the flight of the
growing numbers of [B]lacks who-fearing the worst-were fleeing
the country. In response, executive orders were issued and imple-
mented, barring [BIlacks from leaving the country until the Space
Traders' proposition was fully debated and resolved. "It is your pa-
triotic duty," [B]lacks were told, "to allow this great issue to be re-
solved through the democratic process and in accordance with the
rule of law." 17 0
Legal challenges to the process itself are dismissed as "political
questions," and those in favor of acceptance the Space Traders' offer
dispel claims that acceptance would violate the Constitution's most
basic protections by drafting legislation to induct all [Bilacks into spe-
cial service of transportation under the terms of the Space Traders'
offer, and convening a constitutional convention to draft a constitu-
tional amendment to validate the legislation. The proposed amend-
ment declares: "Every Citizen is subject at the call of Congress to
selection for special service for periods necessary to protect domestic
interests and international needs."'' Although many Americans
work hard to defeat the amendment, "given the usual fate of minority
rights when subjected to referenda or initiatives," the outcome is all
but predetermined.
By a vote of seventy percent in favor-thirty percent opposed-
Americans accepted the Space Traders' proposition. Expecting this
result, the government agencies had secretly made preparations to
facilitate the transfer. Some [B]lacks escaped, and many thousands
lost their lives in futile efforts to resist the joint federal and state
police teams responsible for the roundup, cataloguing, and trans-
portation of [B]lacks to the coast.
The dawn of the last Martin Luther King holiday that the na-
tion would ever observe illuminated an extraordinary sight. The
Space Traders had drawn their strange ships right up to the beaches,
discharged their cargoes of gold, minerals, and machinery, and be-
gan loading long lines of silent [B]lack people. At the Traders' di-
rection, the inductees were stripped of all but a single
170. Id. at 4.
171. Id. at 5.
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undergarment. Heads bowed, arms linked by chains, [B]lack people
left the new world as their forebears had arrived.
1 72
I repeat Professor Bell's Space Traders narrative here for two
reasons: First, it illustrates, in a manner that only narrative can, the
limits of Equal Protection when the interests of the majority are at
stake. Second, it dovetails with my argument about the messages
communicated by the Confederate flag. With the Confederate flag
flying in front of the South Carolina Capitol building, and incorpo-
rated in the Georgia flag, those states make clear where they would
stand should the Space Traders in fact land. In truth though, there is
no need to imagine such a fantastic scenario. Each day, Southern
states make good on the promises inherent in their display of the Con-
federate flag by according certain benefits to its majority citizens, and
imposing certain burdens on its minority citizens.173 It is evident in
how public services are distributed and school budgets are appor-
tioned.174  It is evident in how justice is administered.1 75 It is even
evident in where dumps are placed. 176
172. Id.
173. The subordination message carried in the Confederate flag was recently replayed in the
gubernatorial race in Mississippi. In campaigning, the Republican candidate, former head of the
Republican National Committee Haley Barbour, wore a lapel pin bearing the United States and
Mississippi flags, the latter of which features the Confederate battle emblem, to "encourage a
strong [W]hite turnout." David E. Rosenbaum, Mississippi Incumbent Surprises His G.O.P. Op-
poneni, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2003, at A16. The candidate's display of the flag, it can be argued,
functioned as a promise to put the concerns of White Mississippians first. See also Dawidoff,
supra note 91 (noting Barbour's appeal to Whites, and his appearance at a function organized by
the White segregationist organization Council of Conservative Citizens to raise funds for private
academy school buses).
174. Cases challenging school financing disparity based on district wealth, which in general
correlates to racial composition, have not fared well for the most part. See, e.g., McDaniel v.
Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981) (dismissing school finance lawsuit in deference to Georgia
legislature); Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988) (rejecting claim that sys-
tem for financing public schools based on district wealth violates state constitutional require-
ments for free public schools or for equal protection). On school financing inequality in general
and the racial implications, see Kenneth Fox, The Suspectness of Wealth: Another Look at State
Constitutional Adjudication of School Finance Inequalities, 26 CoNN. L. REv. 1139 (1994); De-
nise C. Morgan, The New School Finance Litigation: Acknowledgng That Race Discrimination in
Public Education Is More Than Just a Tort, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 99 (2001).
175. See generally Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and
the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1411-13 (1988) (noting the continuing pervasive-
ness of racism in the administration of criminal justice in the South).
176. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITINGS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND
THEIR CORRELATION WITH THE RACIAL AND SOCIAL-EcoNoMic STATUS OF SURROUNDING
COMMUNIrIES (GAO/RCED-83-168, June 1983) (examining four communities near hazardous
waste landfills in the Southeast and finding that Blacks were the majority population in three of
the four communities); see also Edward Patrick Boyle, Note, It's Not Easy Being Green, The
Psychology of Racism, Environmental Discrimination, and the Argument for Modernizing Equal
Protection Analysis, 46 VAND. L. REV. 937 (1993); Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental
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V. FLAGS: FROM THEORY TO PRAXIS
On March 4, 1861, the same day that Abraham Lincoln became
President, the Convention of the Confederate States of America,
meeting in Montgomery, Alabama, adopted a Confederate flag as a
demonstration of their intent to preserve the sovereignty of the
South.'7 7 This first Confederate flag, which retained the colors of the
Stars and Stripes, but displayed only seven stars, was roundly criti-
cized for sharing too great a resemblance to the Stars and Stripes. In-
deed, the resemblance was so great that following the outbreak of the
Civil War, one flag was often mistaken for the other in battle. 78 To
reduce confusion, Confederate soldiers began to carry an alternative
flag designed by William Porcher Miles in its stead. This alternative
flag, first used by General Pierre G.T. Beauregard, consisted of a red
field spanned by a blue Saint Andrew's cross edged with white and
bearing along its arms thirteen white stars, and became known as
"Beauregard's Battle Flag," the "Battle Flag of the Confederacy," and
the "Southern Cross."' 179 It was this unofficial flag that enjoyed cur-
rency among [WIhite secessionists.
On May 1, 1863, to address the concerns about the official Con-
federate flag, the Confederate Congress at Richmond adopted a sec-
ond flag, which consisted of a canton of the Southern Cross set against
a plain white field. Advocates of this flag, commenting on its white
field, or perhaps articulating meaning, and its exclusion, christened
this flag the "White Man's Flag."' 80
Although this "White Man's Flag" also had its flaws - its dimen-
sions proved cumbersome, and the white field suggested truce - it re-
mained the official flag of the Confederacy until February 4, 1865,
when the Confederate Congress adopted its third official flag. This
third flag altered the dimensions of the second flag and added a red
bar to the white field. Before this third flag could enter circulation,
however, General Lee surrendered at Appomattox, Virginia, effec-
tively bringing the war to an end. Interestingly, it was not under any
of the official Confederate flags that Lee surrendered, but rather
Injustice: Weighing Race and Class as Factors in the Distribution of Environmental Hazards, 63
U. CoLo. L. REv. 921 (1992).
177. JOHNSON, THE NATIONAL FLAG, supra note 98, at 91.
178. Id. at 92; see also MILO M. QUAIFE ET AL., THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FLAG
143-45 (1961).




under the unofficial flag General Beauregard championed, the "Battle
Flag of the Confederacy," or as others called it, the "Southern
Cross."'' Similarly, it was this unofficial flag, rather than any of the
official flags, that came to stand for the ensign of the Confederacy.
Later, a group of former Confederate soldiers and their followers
would adopt this unofficial flag as their own.182 Donning white robes
and hoods to conjure the ghosts of the Confederate dead,t8 3 they
would transform the southern cross of the flag into hundreds of
wooden crosses, easy to bear, easy to plant, easy to burn. They would
carry out a reign of terror so debilitating, so demoralizing, so dehu-
manizing, that even a stoic like Justice Thomas would get it.
Almost 100 years later, in 1956, the same year that Georgia, in
response to Brown I and Brown H, adopted a new design for its state
flag to incorporate this unofficial, but now iconic, Confederate battle
flag, South Carolina Senator John D. Long successfully introduced a
resolution urging the Senate, at the time all White, to hang a Confed-
erate battle flag in its chambers."s Although the South Carolina Sen-
ate and House journals are silent as to any debate when the
Confederate flag was raised over the state capitol, historical context,
as well as Senator Long's sentiments with regard to the KKK, render
the intent transparent. For example, in a speech on the floor of the
South Carolina Senate, Senator Long praised the KKK, saying, "We
honor them and we are proud of them. We will defend them from
defamation to the death." During the same speech, Senator Long
urged his fellow senators to "dismiss from your consideration any lit-
tle-sister sob stories about the South's brutality to the slave and its
inhuman treatment of captive and fugitive slaves."' 1 5 These were the
sentiments Senator Long expressed. Later, a lake in South Carolina
181. Id.
182. WYN WADE, THE FIREY CROSS: THE Ku KLUX KLAN IN AMERICA 33-35 (1998). As
one Klansman put it in a letter to the editor of a southern newspaper:
The soldiers of the South who fought for that flag, their officers and civilian leaders
believed in the establishment of a separate [slouthern republic; so does this Klan. They
believed in [W]hite supremacy; so does this Klan.
So, we maintain that the Confederate battle flag was bequeathed to us, the Ku
Klux Klan, by our Confederate ancestors. We honor it by standing for the same things
now as they did then. Our use of the flag is legitimate and honorable.
Southern apologists, knee-jerk liberal New South politicians, pansy pants preach-
ers, pinko professors and whoever else will not stand with us in what our flag stands for
can wrap themselves in the Yankee flag and leave ours alone.
Marcus Blanton, Confederate Battle Flag Was Bequeathed to Klan, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson,
Miss.), June 6, 1991, at 18A (letter to the editor).
183. WADE, supra note 182, at 33-35.




would be named after him, John D. Long Lake, and a woman named
Susan Smith, in an act of infanticide-make that two acts of infanti-
cide-would quietly strap her two toddlers, Michael Daniel Smith and
Alexander Tyler Smith, into their car seats, and then just as quietly
push her car into the lake. Invoking the collective prejudices of a
country, and the implied promises of her state, she would nearly get
away with murder.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, any future Equal Protection challenge to South Caro-
lina's display of the Confederate flag in front of its capitol building
should lay bare this historiography to satisfy the intent prong of
Hunter. Similarly, any future challenge should also present evidence
to refute the suggestion that all races are equally offended by the Con-
federate flag. Specifically, empirical data and expert testimony should
be introduced to demonstrate that minorities read and experience the
Confederate flag differently, that minority groups are disparately im-
pacted, thus satisfying the second prong of Hunter. Just as the
NAACP submitted Kenneth and Mamie Clark's "doll" study in
Brown to support their challenge to de jure school desegregation,186
statistical evidence could be gathered to demonstrate that members of
minority groups, in contrast to members of the majority, view the flag
not only as a badge of inferiority, but as communicating messages of
exclusion, of powerlessness, of lacking protection by the state, of be-
ing second-class citizens. Such analysis could demonstrate that these
feelings are more than visceral; indeed, they are amply supported by
evidence of discriminatory treatment and services. This analysis could
also demonstrate the impact state displays of the flag have on the day-
to-day lives of various citizens: That for Whites, they buttress feelings
of superiority, privilege, and entitlement, and conversely for minority
186. In their 1940 study, the Clarks found that children presented with identical Black and
White dolls thought of the White doll as "nice" and the Black doll as the one "that looks bad."
Kenneth B. Clark & Mamie Clark, Racial Identification and Preference in Negro Children, in
READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 169-78 (Theodore M. Newcomb et al. eds., 1947). The
Brown Court relied in part on this study to conclude that segregation of African American chil-
dren "generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
494-95 & n.11 (1954). For more on the NAACP's decision to use social science data in Brown,
see JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 197-205 (1998).
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citizens, convey feelings of inferiority which circumscribe, shape, and
inform their daily lives. 187
In addition to presenting evidence of intent and harm, however,
any future challenge could only be strengthened by including an anal-
ysis of the symbolic power of flags. Such a contextual approach will
not only impress upon the court messages communicated by the state
display of the Confederate flag, but may also motivate a court to con-
sider the Equal Protection challenge through the more inclusive lens
of anti-subordination or equal citizenship, rather than anti-differentia-
tion. I hope such an approach proves fruitful.
I began this discussion by talking about my interest in exploring
whether the state display of the Confederate flag violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I can only conclude
by positing that the state display of the flag violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, and more. In the end, the state display of the Confeder-
ate flag itself functions as a pledge, a pledge of allegiance, to protect
one class of citizens over another, to mark an entire state and its re-
sources as belonging, in the first instance, to one class of citizens over
another, and to preserve a hegemony that accords one class of citizens
a higher status than another.
187. Since Brown, the Supreme Court has relied on social science data in a number of cases,
including cases involving obscenity, segregation by gender, jury size, and capital punishment,
although in McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court seemed to retreat from its willingness to find social
science persuasive. See supra note 87. On the use of social science in Equal Protection jurispru-
dence generally, see David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social
Science to Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005 (1989); Henry F. Fradella, A Content
Analysis of Federal Judicial Views of the Social Science "Researcher's Black Arts, " 35 RUTGERS L.
J. 103 (2003).
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